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Abstract
This paper develops a macroeconomic model of the interaction between consumer debt
and rm debt over the business cycle. I incorporate interest rate spreads generated by rm
and household loan default risk into a real business cycle model. I estimate the model on US
aggregate data. This allows me to analyse the quantitative importance of possible feedback
e¤ects between the debt levels of rms and households, and the relative contributions of -
nancial and supply shocks to economic uctuations. While rm level credit market frictions
signicantly amplify the response of investment to shocks, they do not amplify output re-
sponses. In general equilibrium, higher external nancing spreads for households contribute
to lower external nancing spreads for rms, contrary to traditional Keynesian predictions.
Furthermore, total factor productivity shocks remain an important source of business cycles
in my model. They are responsible for 71 - 74% of the variance of output and 56 - 69%
of the variance of consumption in the model. Financial shocks are important in explaining
interest rate spreads and leverage ratios, but they account for less than 11% of the uctu-
ations in output. My results suggest that other factors, beyond credit market frictions on
their own, are necessary to justify an important role for nancial shocks in aggregate output
uctuations.
JEL classication: E3, E4, G3.
Key words: Financial frictions, external nance premium, DSGE models, Bayesian esti-
mation, business cycles.
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.1 Introduction
Financing frictions are often suggested as a prime candidate for amplifying the e¤ects of
shocks hitting the economy. The basic idea, often called the nancial accelerator, is that
in the presence of credit constraints exogenous shocks can generate a positive feedback
e¤ect between the nancial health of borrowing rms or households and output (Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) [9]). The standard approach to analysing credit constraints
over the business cycle focuses either on households or on rms in isolation (see Christiano
et al. (2010) [23] and Iacoviello and Neri (2009) [38] for prominent examples). This assumes
that the strength and the e¤ect of the two types of nancing frictions are independent of
each other. However, if both household and rm level nancing frictions create nancial
accelerators which on their own amplify output uctuations, then intuitively there could be
a positive interaction between them. In that case, focusing on only one type of nancing
frictions at a time could signicantly underestimate their overall e¤ect on business cycles.
To quote Bernanke et al (1999) [9]:
" By enforcing the standard consumption Euler equation (in the rm nancial accelerator
model), we are e¤ectively assuming that nancial market frictions do not impede household
behavior... An interesting extension of this model would be to incorporate household borrowing
and associated frictions. With some slight modication, the nancial accelerator would then
also apply to household spending, strengthening the overall e¤ect."
This paper builds a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that integrates
both rm and household debt, while improving in several dimensions on the most popular
existing models such as Bernanke et al (1999) [9] and Iacoviello (2005) [37]. I incorporate
external nancing spreads faced by rms and households due to loan default risk, generating
endogenous movements in the debt to collateral ratios (henceforth also leverage ratios) of
borrowers. The modeling framework that I develop has a rich pattern of interactions between
external nancing conditions, consumption and production decisions. It provides a partial
microfoundation for preference and risk premium shocks that some models without explicit
nancial frictions have found to be important (e.g Smets and Wouters (2007) [55]). At the
same time it is tractable enough to be used more generally in business cycle and monetary
policy models. 1I use a mixture of Bayesian estimation and calibration to determine the
models parameters. Using these estimates, I examine the possibility of feedback e¤ects
between the strength of nancing frictions a¤ecting rms and households, and evaluate the
relative importance of nancial and supply shocks as alternative sources of business cycles.
1For example, Daracq-Paries et al (2010) [25] have extended the model in an earlier version of this paper
to analyse bank capital regulation in an environment with banking frictions and nominal price rigidities.
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A key premise underlying the possibility of positive interaction is that worse household
nancial conditions contribute to reductions in aggregate economic activity. Mian and Su
(2009) [49] provide some empirical evidence on this point. They rank US counties by the
growth rate in household leverage (measured by debt to income) in 2002-2006. They nd that
in 2006-2008 the unemployment rate increased by about 2.5% more in the top 10% leverage
growth counties than in the bottom 10% leverage growth counties. This sort of evidence is
suggestive of a positive relation between the leverage level of households and the sensitivity of
aggregate economic activity to shocks, which can then a¤ect the tightness of rmsborrowing
constraints through a nancial accelerator e¤ect. However, it does not necessarily represent
a causal link from worse nancial conditions for households to worse nancial conditions for
rms. Mian and Sus correlations are also compatible with a situation in which a common
factor caused both higher business and household leverage in certain counties in the early
2000s, subsequently making these counties more vulnerable to a recession. To gain a better
understanding of the causal relation between rm and household sector borrowing requires
a more structural general equilibrium approach.
The main economic agents in my model are nancially constrained rms that can borrow
by using revenue and capital as collateral, nancially constrained households that use debt
collateralised by housing, and nancially unconstrained households that fund borrowers. I
focus on real estate collateralised loans for households since this is by far the most common
type of loan, accounting for 81.5% of household debt in the US Survey of Consumer Finances
of 2001 (Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) [13]). I follow other macroeconomic models of nan-
cial frictions in using di¤erences in the level of impatience of agents to generate equilibrium
borrowing and lending (e.g. Iacoviello (2005) [37]). Both borrowing rms and households
are a¤ected by idiosyncratic shocks to their collateral values. While borrowers can insure
themselves against the idiosyncratic risk, as in representative agent business cycle models,
the lender cannot seize the proceeds of the insurance. As a result, borrowers default on
their loans when the value of their collateral is below the repayment promised to the lender.
In case of default, the lender can seize collateral at a cost. The combination of insurance
and limited liability partially preserves the e¤ects of risk averse/consumption-smoothing be-
haviour of agents despite the ex-ante heterogeneity among agents and the nonlinear default
decision. 2 The possibility of default generates a trade-o¤ for borrowers between a bigger
loan relative to the collateral (the leverage ratio) and a lower interest rate on the loan.
This is a realistic feature of loan contracts that is missing from models without equilibrium
default. In light of the renewed interest in studying the e¤ect of turbulence in nancial
markets on the macroeconomy I add nancial shocks to the model, measured as exogenous
changes in the e¢ ciency of the collateral seizure technology. This can be seen as a reduced
form modeling of changes in the level of asymmetric information or moral hazard related to
nancially distressed households or rms, or more generally nancial intermediaries whose
2These insurance contracts are mathematically equivalent to the the large household assumption in Shi
(1997) [54] and other labour market and monetary search models.
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portfolios are heavily loaded with loans to distressed borrowers. 3
As a benchmark, I focus on a model with exible price and wage adjustment. I nd
that credit constraints on their own are not enough to overturn the important role of total
factor productivity (henceforth TFP) shocks in generating business cycles. At the posterior
mode parameter estimates these shocks account for 71% - 74% of the long run variance
of output (depending on the denition of the trend). While nancial constraints amplify
the response of investment to TFP shocks, they do not signicantly amplify the response
of output except for the rst period or two after a TFP shock. I nd that in general
equilibrium worse credit frictions for households tend to reduce credit frictions for rms,
though other common factors can generate positive comovement between rm and household
credit spreads. Finally, household credit frictions do not create bigger uctuations in housing
investment and prices relative to a frictionless model.
TFP shocks remain important in my model because nancing frictions on their own do
not generate su¢ cient uctuations in output in the short run, when capital is approximately
xed. Absent movements in TFP, we need a strong procyclicality of labour demand and the
capital utilisation rate to move output. In my framework, nancing frictions a¤ect hiring
and capital utilisation decisions of rms. In partial equilibrium a higher cost of external
nancing reduces labour demand and the capital utilisation rate in a recession, and vice
versa in a boom. In general equilibrium the more procyclical price of capital in the model
with nancing frictions reduces the procyclicality of capital utilisation, by making capital
depreciation more costly in expansions and less costly in recessions. Combining these e¤ects,
we still need exogenous changes in TFP to generate realistic output movements. The reduced
procyclicality of capital utilisation rates relative to a frictionless benchmark helps explain
why nancing frictions do not signicantly increase the volatility of output uctuations. 4
That higher household nancing frictions can reduce rm nancing frictions may seem
surprising, at least if one expects household nancing frictions to act like a nancial acceler-
ator. A recession in my model worsens borrowing householdsexternal nancing conditions
and reduces their consumption more severely than without nancing frictions. A traditional
Keynesian analysis would be that by reducing rms revenue that are part of collateral,
this should worsen nancing conditions for rms. In my model prices are exible, so that
output is not aggregate demand determined for some rms in the short run as in sticky
price models. Nevertheless, with external nancing costs that in general equilibrium are in
part a function of aggregate output and with adjustment costs hindering the reallocation of
resources between production of consumption and investment goods, it may still be possible
3See Jermann and Quadrini (2008) [40] and Christiano et al. (2010) [23] for alternative ways of introducing
nancial or credit shocks.
4Another way of thinking about this is that while nancing frictions a¤ecting labour demand and capital
utilisation can produce countercyclical "markups" that amplify output uctuations, similar to imperfect
competition models (e.g Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) [39]), this countercylicality is relatively weak for
my estimated parameter values.
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to get a positive interaction between household and rm nancing frictions even with exible
price adjustment. At the same time there are other e¤ects going in the opposite direction.
First, higher nancing frictions for households reduce their demand for loans, decreasing
interest rates faced by rms. This lowers rmsexternal nancing frictions. Second, greater
di¢ culties in getting external nancing encourage borrowers to increase labour supply to
compensate, similar to the e¤ect of a decline in household wealth. This reduces wage rates
and raises rmsoutput. Since output is partially used as collateral, this increases the value
of rmscollateral and improves their nancing conditions. The overall result for my esti-
mated parameter values is that worse nancing conditions for rms actually lead to a slight
improvement in rmsnancing conditions.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the model and provides a theoretical
analysis of the impact of nancial frictions. I start with a partial equilibrium analysis,
and then examine the general equilibrium links between rm and household credit frictions.
Section 3 discusses the estimation of the model and its quantitative implications in terms
of the response of the economy to shocks, the sources of uctuations in the model and the
models prediction for macroeconomic time series statistics. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Most existing models of household borrowing with aggregate uctuations follow Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) [42] or Iacoviello (2005) [37] in using a pure quantity borrowing constraint
and assuming it always binds. The assumption of an always binding quantity borrowing
constraint may fail for large shocks, and it may severely distort the dynamics of borrowers
and the rest of the economy in those circumstances. It also eliminates endogenous movements
in borrowersleverage level. The equilibrium default mechanism in my model (with interest
rates rising smoothly as a function of borrowing) gets around this issue. Furthermore, the
model proposed here can at least qualitatively match the countercyclical leverage ratio of
rms and households found in the US by Adrian and Shin (2008) [1]. At the same time, the
nancial shocks in my model can potentially generate episodes of procyclical leverage, like
the early 2000s in the US.
Bernanke et al. (henceforth BGG) (1999) [9], and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) [15]
introduced equilibrium default of rms into DSGE models. To facilitate aggregation, they
assumed risk neutral entrepreneurs. In contrast, I use a setup with both equilibrium default
and risk averse agents. The consumption smoothing motive and risk aversion of owners
may play an important role in the decisions of rms. Assuming risk neutrality eliminates
these factors from the analysis. The risk aversion of borrowers in my model also makes it
more applicable to households. Aoki et al (2004) [5] model equilibrium default on loans
collateralised by housing in a DSGE model with aggregate shocks. They adapt the BGG
framework to housing by positing the existence of a special class of risk neutral home owners
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that rent homes to households. The nancing frictions in their model apply to these home
owners as opposed to the risk averse households. In order to model an e¤ect of housing
wealth on household consumption they are forced to adopt an ad-hoc dividend payment rule
between home owners and households as well as assuming rule of thumb consumers that
simply consume all their wealth each period.
To my knowledge, this is the rst business cycle model that takes into account default risk
on both consumer and rm loans. This allows me to examine the impact of endogenous time
varying interest rate spreads and leverage ratios. My model of rmsnancial constraints
allows me to consider a more standard formulation of entrepreneur balance sheets than the
less conventional balance sheets used by BGG or Carlstrom and Fuerst to make their models
tractable. In particular, rms in my model own their capital stock, as in more sophisticated
heterogeneous agent models of nancing constraints, and do not have to repurchase it or rent
it each period as in BGG or Carlstrom and Fuerst (assumptions which are no longer without
loss of generality in the presence of nancing frictions). My model also allows the researcher
to consider other nonlinearities in the balance sheet of nancially constrained rms, such
as imperfect competition or labour adjustment costs. This exibility may be important in
extensions to study the interaction of credit constraints and pricing or labour demand in
more detail.
Iacoviello (2005) [37] and Gerali et al (2010) [32] also model nancing frictions a¤ecting
both households and rms. Both of these papers rely on quantity borrowing constraints as
in Kiyotaki and Moore [42] to model credit frictions and assume the borrowing constraints
always bind. The analysis in this paper of an environment with default costs and actual
lending spreads provides an alternative perspective. These papers do not explicitly examine
the e¤ect of modeling both types of nancing frictions as opposed to just one type, choosing
to focus on other issues. They assume a xed stock of structures, eliminating any role
for residential investment, or forcing a counterfactual negative correlation between business
structures and residential investment. Finally, they analyse models with nominal rigidities
which mix real e¤ects of nancing frictions with other channels. In contrast, this paper
isolates the interaction between household and rm nancing frictions in the exible price
and wage equilibrium of the economy. This equilibrium denes an output gap relative to the
equilibrium with sticky prices or wages that is critical in monetary policy analysis. Therefore,
the results should also be relevant to models with nominal rigidities. 5
5At the same time, the importance of nominal price and wage rigidities for aggregate output dynamics
is not without controversy (e.g Barro (1977) [7], Pissarides (2008) [51] and Williamson and Wright (2010)
[58]). From this perspective, understanding the e¤ects of nancing constraints with exible prices and wages
may be even more important.
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2 A Model of Firm and Household Leverage
There are two types of households distinguished by their discount factors. Patient
households with a relatively high discount factor lend to other households and rms, as well
as owning some of the rms in the economy. Impatient households with a lower discount
factor borrow from the patient households to nance housing and consumption subject to
nancing frictions. Financially constrained entrepreneurs own the capital of the economy
and produce nal output. They borrow from patient households to nance consumption
, investment and wages subject to credit constraints. These entrepreneurs are also more
impatient than the lenders. 6 Capital and housing producers transform nal output into new
capital and housing subject to adjustment costs, and are owned by the patient households.
2.1 The Household Sector
2.1.1 Patient Households (savers)
There is a measure s of patient households that have a relatively high discount factor,
and access to complete nancial markets without any nancing constraints. Households de-
rive utility from non durable consumption, leisure and housing. They provide loans through
banks to rms and households. Following BGG(1999) [9] and Iacoviello(2005) [37] I assume
that the deposits are risk free in aggregate. The representative saver picks non-negative
sequences of consumption, working hours, housing and deposits at the bank
fcs;t; ns;t; hs;t; dtg1t=0
to maximise
E0
1
t=0
tus;t; (1)
where
us;t =
(c
c
s;th
h
s;t (1  ns;t)n)1 
1   ; for  6= 1; (2)
us;t = c ln cs;t + h lnhs;t + (1  c   h) ln(1  ns;t), for  = 1;
n = 1  c   h:
6For other models using discount factor di¤erences to generate equilibrium borrowing, see Iacoviello(2005)
[37] and Krusell and Smith(1998)[45] for households, Carlstrom and Fuerst(1997,1998[15][16]) and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) [42] for rms. There is some evidence from estimation of structural consumption models
supporting this heterogeneity in preferences (Cagetti(2003)[12]). Higher impatience is also a reduced form
proxy for higher expected income growth (see Browning and Tobacmans(2007)[10]) , or Carroll (2000)[17]).
Under this interpretation, the impatient agents roughly correspond to young homeowners with an upward
sloping expected wage prole that use borrowing to enjoy some of their higher future salaries in terms of
consumption today. The patient households can be thought of as middle aged households with relatively low
expected salary growth and higher savings. Survey of Consumer Finances data on the lifecycle pattern of
wage growth and nancial asset holdings are consistent with this interpretations (Hintermaier and Koeniger
(2009) [36]). The entrepreneurs relative impatience can also be interpreted as reecting a higher expected
future prot growth relative to more mature but nancially unconstrained rms, or a higher death rate of
entrepreneurial rms relative to households.
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subject to a sequence of constraints
cs;t + qt[h
s
t   (1  h)hs;t 1] + dt = Rtdt 1 + wtns;t +s;t; (3)
where st are prots from housing and capital producers.
2.1.2 Impatient Households (borrowers)
There is a measure bo  1   s of impatient households. They have the same intra-
period preferences over housing,consumption and leisure as patient households, but they
have a lower discount factor than lenders(patient households):
bo < :
The lower discount factor means that impatient households will be borrowers in a neigh-
borhood of the steady state. Without any frictions their borrowing would be unbounded in
the steady state. Financing frictions make borrowing lbo;t bounded. The value of borrowers
housing stock is subject to idiosyncratic shocks "bo;t that are i.i.d across borrowers and across
time. "bo;t has a CDF
F ("bo;t), with F 0("bo;t) = f("bo;t); and E("bo) = 1: (4)
As in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(1999) [9], I assume "bo;t follows a log normal distribu-
tion, so that
d

"f(")
1 F (")

d"e
> 0
over the range that is relevant for the optimal debt contract. It is useful to dene resources
before debt repayment and new loans
Abo;t = "bo;tqt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + nbo;twt; (5)
Abo;t = qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + nbo;twt:
Lending in this economy is only possible through 1-period debt contracts that require a
constant repayment Rltlbo;t 1 independent of "bo;t for the borrower to avoid costly loan mon-
itoring or enforcement, where Rlt is the loan rate. The borrower can default and refuse to
repay the debt: Savers cannot force borrowers to repay. Instead lending must be intermedi-
ated by banks that have a loan enforcement technology allowing them to seize collateral
"bo;t ~Abo;t = "bo;tqt(1  h)hbo;t 1 (6)
at a proportional cost bo;t"bo;t ~Abo;t when the borrower defaults. bo;t 2 (0; 1) determines
the deadweight cost of default. To introduce nancial shocks, I assume this parameter is
stochastic with
ln

bo;t+1
1  bo;t+1

  ln

bo
1  bo

= 

ln

bo;t
1  bo;t

  ln

bo
1  bo

+ ";t; (7)
";t  N(0; ):
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The timing of the innovation ";t is such that bo;t+1 is known by both parties when signing
the loan contract to be repaid at t + 1: If the borrower defaults, the bank can seize the
collateral "bo;t ~Abo;t: Suppose rst that the borrower does not have access to any insurance
against the idiosyncratic "bo;t shock. When
"bo;t < "bo;t
the borrower prefers to default and lose
"bo;t ~Abo;t < R
l
tlbo;t 1  "bo;t ~Abo;t (8)
when the bank enforces the contract: On the other hand when
"bo;t  "bo;t
the borrower prefers to pay Rltlbo;t 1 rather than lose
"bo;t ~Abo;t  Rltlbo;t 1:
To be able to use a representative agent framework while maintaining the intuition of the
default rule above, I make two assumptions. First, borrowerslabour supply is predetermined
with respect to the idiosyncratic shock. Second, borrowers have access to insurance contracts
providing them with payments conditional on the realisation of "bo;t;
pbo( Abo;t   Abo;t +min["bo;t; "bo;t] ~Abo;t   [(1  F ("bo;t))"bo;t +
Z "bo;t
0
"dF ] ~Abot)
with
0  pbo  1:
The insurer can fully diversify "bo;t across many households. Averaging across all households
it makes zero prots. I restrict contracts to complete insurance with pbo = 1, guaranteeing
the borrower the expected ex-ante value of his house net of loan repayments. Risk averse
borrowers willingly buy this contract, which completely diversies the risk related to "bo;t.
The insurance payments cannot be seized by the bank. The borrower cannot commit to
always repay the loan even though from an ex-ante perspective it is optimal to do so. There-
fore, as in the case of uninsured risk, the borrower defaults for low values of the collateral.
The borrower repays the lender
min["bo;t; "bo;t] ~Abo;t:
After taking into account the insurance, this leaves the borrower with total resources before
new loans of
Abo;t  RP ("bo;t) ~Abo;t; where (9)
RP ("bot) = (1  F ("bo;t))"bo;t +
Z "bo;t
0
"bodF:
9
The repayment function RP ("bot) gives the proportion of the collaterals expected value
lost to the lender. 7 While this level of insurance is clearly exaggerated, it provides a
signicant gain in tractability. The pbo = 1 case of full insurance can also be used as a
point around which to approximate more realistic partial insurance or the uninsurable risk
case with pbo = 0 through perturbation methods. 8 For these reasons, the full insurance
assumption is a useful benchmark for starting the analysis. Even with full insurance, we
can still have a nondegenerate distribution of default rates and loan positions for arbitrary
initial resource distributions among borrowers. To further simplify the model, I assume
a symmetric initial distribution of housing among borrowers. This leads to a symmetric
distribution of assets and income across borrowers, and allows us to discuss their choices
using a representative borrower (henceforth also called the borrower).
Dene the rate of return required on loans made at t  1 as Rt (to be distinguished from
the loan rate Rlt): Since "bo;t is idiosyncratic the bank can diversify it by lending to a large
number of borrowers. Therefore it only requires that the loan is protable in expectation.
Loan rates depend on the aggregate state of the economy as in Bernanke et al. (1999) [9].
In order to participate in the loan, the bank requires that
[1  F ("bo;t)] "bo;t ~Abo;t + (1  bo;t)
Z "bo;t
0
~Abo;t"bodF  Rtlbo;t 1: (10)
The bank participation constraint above will act as a borrowing constraint in this model.
Competition among banks makes the participation constraint bind. Dening
G("
bo;t) = RP ("bot)  bo;t
Z "bo;t
0
"bodF; (11)
we can rewrite the participation constraint as
G("bo;t) ~Abo;t = Rtlbo;t 1: (12)
Since deposits are required to be risk-free, Rt = Rt; the risk free rate. G("bo;t) is the loan to
collateral ratio, a measure of leverage. 9 G("bo;t) is increasing in the default threshold "bot at
7This default rule only holds without moving costs for housing. In a model with realistic non-convex
moving costs, the default rule would be adjusted so that the household only considers defaulting when it
decides to move(e.g Garriga et al (2009) [30]). My derivation of the default rule also assumes that deposits
are not seizable by the bank. This is without loss of generality: Suppose borrowers deposits dbo;t 1(or
another safe asset such as money) can be seized by lenders to repay debt at a cost dRtdbo;t 1 with d  0:
If d > 0; a borrower would never want to hold deposits and loans simultaneously. In the special case of
d = 0 and Rt = Rt(deposits are a perfect collateral), lbo;t   dbo;t is indeterminate, and we can set dbot = 0
without loss of generality.
8See Algan et al (2009)[2] for an example of using a model without idiosyncratic shocks or with insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks as a point around which to approximate a model without insurance.
9Another frequently used denition of leverage is the ratio of collateral to equity in the loan. This measure
is an increasing function of the loan to collateral ratio.
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an optimum. Therefore we can solve for a function "bo(
Rtlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
); with the default threshold
"bo;t increasing in leverage. For a given idiosyncratic risk distribution the default rate is
increasing in the default threshold, so that a higher debt to collateral ratio also increases the
probability of default. 10
Given the households choices for consumption, housing, loan size and labour supply,
the lender confronts the borrower with a schedule of loan rates Rlt that respect the bank
participation constraints. With perfect competition among banks for customers, and us-
ing the equation linking Rlt and "bo;t; we can represent the problem of borrowers as if they
choose default thresholds as a function of the aggregate states directly, subject to the banks
participation constraints. The representative borrower picks non-negative sequences of con-
sumption,housing, loans, deposits, labour supply and default threshold functions
fcbo;t; hbo;t; lbo;t; dbo;t; nbo;t; "bo;tg1t=0
to maximise
E0
1
t=0
botubo;t (13)
where
ubo;t =
(c
c
bo;th
h
bo;t(1  nbo;t)n)1 
1   for  6= 1 (14)
ubo;t = c ln cbo;t + h lnhbo;t + n ln(1  nbo;t) for  = 1;
subject to a sequence of budget constraints
cbo;t+qthbo;t+dbo;t+RP ("bo;t)qt(1 h)hbo;t 1 = qt(1 h)hbo;t 1+nbo;twt+lbo:t+dbo;t 1Rt (15)
, and participation constraints of the bank
G("bo;t) ~Abo;t = G("bo;t)qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 = Rtlbo;t 1: (16)
In a neighbourhood of the steady state impatient households will set dbo;t = 0 and lbo;t 1 >
0 for all t:11
10The caveat is that if a new unexpected shock at time t signicantly lowers the value of ~Abo;t it may
be impossible to nd a default threshold that allows the bank to break even on the loan with the risk free
rate. This should not be a major concern except for very low aggregate shock values. We can completely
eliminate this possibility in the version of the model in which loan rates are predetermined with respect to
the aggregate state, detailed in appendix C. See the appendix in BGG(1999)[9] for a discussion of the same
issue in their model.
11It is impossible to simultaneously have lbo;t > 0 dbo;t > 0. What cannot be excluded completely is
that impatient households may wish to become savers for large enough positive shocks. This would be
particularly troublesome in a model with a xed borrowing limit as in Carroll (2001).[18]Here, we have a
procyclical borrowing limit, and an impatient household would want to increase its borrowing in response
to a higher limit.
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2.2 Production
2.2.1 Financially Constrained Entrepreneurs
There is a measure 1 continuum of risk averse entrepreneurs that use capital and labour
to produce nal output. Just like borrowing households, I assume that their discount factor
is below that of savers to guarantee that they borrow in equilibrium in a neighborhood of
the steady state. Entrepreneurscapital and output are subject to common multiplicative
idiosyncratic shocks "et. These shocks are independent and identically distributed across
time and across entrepreneurs with E("e;t) = 1; a lognormal PDF f("et) and CDF F ("e;t).
Production is also subject to an aggregate TFP shock ze;t.
ze;t = G
t
z;e~ze;t; where (17)
ln ~ze;t+1 =  ln ~ze;t + "z;t+1; "z;t+1  N(0; z) (18)
Dene expected output conditional on the aggregate shock
ye;t = ze;t((ue;tke;t)
n1 e;t )
; 0 <  < 1 and (19)
Ae;t = (1  e;t)qkt ke;t + ye;t:
12 The entrepreneursnancial contract is similar to that of borrowers. Entrepreneurs are
restricted to using one-period debt contracts in which the loan rates can be made contingent
on aggregate shocks zt but not on the idiosyncratic shock "e;t:They have access to insurance
contracts that completely diversify the idiosyncratic risk after loan contracts are settled,
but cannot commit to sharing the proceeds of this insurance with banks. Banks can seize
collateral "e;t ~Ae;t when the entrepreneur refuses to pay at a cost of e"e;t ~Ae;t: As in other
models of nancial frictions such as Jerman and Quadrini (2008) [40] and Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1998) [16], a fraction a of the wage bill must be paid before production occurs,
requiring an intratemporal loan from the bank. 13 The wages in advance of production
requirement implies that the entrepreneur must choose the amount of labour before knowing
the value of "e;t. The new intratemporal loan modies the default rule: the entrepreneur
defaults if and only if
"e;t ~Ae;t < R
l
e;tle;t 1 +R
w
t awtne;t = "e;t
~Ae;t; where (20)
~Ae;t = (1  e;t)qkt ke;t + (1  sy)ye;t; and
e;t = eu
e
et ; e > 1:
12 < 1 is necessary to get a solution to the non stochastic balanced growth path when trying to match
data on average rm default rates, leverage ratios and credit spreads. Trying to match these targets with
 = 1 would lead to an overidentied system of equations. The assumption that  is below 1, but close to 1 is
consistent with empirical evidence (see Atkeson and Kehoe (2007) [6]) and can be interpreted as a reection
of limited span of control for entrepreneurs.
13This sort of working capital nancing friction has been found to play a potentially important role in
helping to explain the e¤ect of credit frictions in response to news and credit shocks (see Inaba and Kobayashi
(2007) [44] and Jermann and Quadrini (2008) [40]). It can help account for Chari et als (2007) [20] nding
of an important role for the labour wedge in their Business Cycle Accounting framework.
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Here, I have adopted Burnside and Eichenbaums (1996) [11] capital utilisation rate speci-
cation , in which more intensive utilisation of capital increases its depreciation rate. I assume
that the capital utilisation rate ue;t is predetermined with respect to the idiosyncratic shock
to facilitate aggregation. sy  0 reects di¤erences in the ability to collateralise capital and
revenue, due to the possibility that wages must be paid before creditors in default or because
proceeds from sales are easier to hide from creditors than structures or equipment. 14 As for
borrowers, I dene
RP ("e;t) = (1  Fe("e;t))"e;t +
Z "e;t
0
"dFe and (21)
G("e;t) = RP ("e;t)  e;t
Z "e;t
0
"dFe: (22)
e;t is subject to the same nancial shock as borrowersbo;t :
ln

e;t+1
1  e;t+1

  ln

e
1  e

= 

ln

e;t
1  e;t

  ln

e
1  e

+ ";t: (23)
The assumption of a common credit shock is a simplication meant to capture in reduced
form the idea that changes in conditions in nancial intermediariesfunding markets tend
to have common e¤ects on consumer and business loan spreads.
Given our nancial contracting environment, the representative entrepreneur picks non-
negative sequences of consumption, capital, utilisation rates, labour demand, default thresh-
olds, loans and deposits
fce;t; ke;t+1; ue;t; ne;t; "e;t; le;t; de;tg1t=0
to maximise
E0
1
t=0
et ln ce;t (24)
subject to a sequence of constraints
ce;t + (1  a)wtne;t + qkt ket+1 + de;t = Ae;t  RP ("e;t) ~Ae;t + le;t +Rtde;t 1 (25)
and the banks break-even constraints
G("e;t) ~Ae;t = Rtle;t 1 + awtne;t (26)
In a neighbourhood of a balanced growth path de;t = 0 and le;t > 0 for all t:
14Our setup can also be interpreted as having each entrepreneur own shares in a continuum of rms that
are his only source of income and for which the allocation of production factors must be determined before
knowing the idiosyncratic rm specic shock. From this perspective our entrepreneurs can be interpreted
more generally as including rich shareholders that own most of the capital stock of the economy. While stock
market participation rates in the US have increased in the 1990s, stock ownership is highly concentrated.
The top 1% of the wealth distribution still own 50% of the stock market (Zawadowski (2010) [59]). According
to Guvenen (2009) [35], even in periods of high participation rates the top quintile of the distribution owns
98% of the stock market value.
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2.2.2 Financially Unconstrained Firms:
For some purposes it will be useful to compare the model where rms are nancially con-
strained with a model where rms are nancially unconstrained. In this case, I replace the
entrepreneurs with a representative rm owned by savers that picks non-negative sequences
of capital, utilisation rates and labour
fku;t+1; uu;t; nu;tg1t=0
to maximise its value
E0
1
t=0
tst [zu;t(uu;tku;t)
n1 u;t   wtnu;t   qkt (ku;t+1   (1  u;t)ku;t)]; (27)
where 0 <  < 1; and u;t = eu
u
u;t:
2.2.3 Capital and Housing Production
I use a standard investment adjustment cost model as in Christiano and Fisher (2003)
[22] for both residential and non-residential investment. This formulation of the adjustment
cost has better empirical properties than the more traditional capital adjustment costs (Topel
and Rosen (1988) [57], Christiano and Fisher (2003) [22]). It can be seen as a reduced form
for time to build and other frictions a¤ecting the supply of new capital and housing. A
representative rm owned by the savers produces new housing. The rm purchases Iht units
of the consumption good and turns it into
Iht = ht   (1  h)ht 1 (28)
units of housing while paying an adjustment cost of
ACh;t =
h
2
(
Iht
Iht 1
 Gy)2Iht : (29)
1
h
is the elasticity of housing investment to a temporary increase in house prices (See Chris-
tiano and Fisher (2003) [22]). With these assumptions, the housing producers problem
reduces to picking sequences of

Iht
	
to maximise
E0
1
t=0
tst [(qt   1)Iht   ACh;t] (30)
Along the balanced growth path, ACh;t = 0; q = 1 and the housing producer makes no
prots. The representative capital producer faces the same problem as housing producers,
except that I allow for investment shocks. The capital producer purchases investment goods
It at a cost of PI;tIt from zero prot competitive investment goods producers. It incurs an
adjustment cost
ACk;t =

2
(
It
It 1
 Gy)2It: (31)
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The capital producer picks sequences of fIt g1t=0 to maximise
E0
1
t=0
tst [(qk;t   PI;t)It   ACk;t] (32)
Without aggregate uctuations, PI;t = qk;t = 1 and ACk;t = 0: With aggregate uctua-
tions, PI;t is subject to shocks:
lnPI;t+1 = I lnPi;t + "I;t+1; I  N(0; I): (33)
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Combining the budget constraints of the models agents gives us the resource constraint
of the economy:
Yt = Ct + PI;tIt + I
h
t + ACt + FFt (34)
, where Ct; It; Iht are aggregate consumption net of nancial services, investment in capital
and investment in housing, ACt are non nancial adjustment costs of capital and housing
and FFt are the dead-weight costs of default on debt contracts, and Yt is aggregate nal
output.
In addition labour and credit market clearing require
sns;t + bonbo;t = ne;t; (35)
sdt = bolbo;t + le;t (36)
Other market clearing conditions, can be similarly derived by aggregating over the deci-
sions of households and entrepreneurs. A competitive equilibrium consists of a set of prices
and risk-free interest rates fqt; qkt ; Rt+1; wtg for all possible states and for all t  0 such that
all markets clear when households and rms solve their maximisation problems while taking
these prices and risk-free interest rates as given.
2.4 Understanding the E¤ect of Financing Constraints in theModel
Before proceeding to estimate and quantify the e¤ects of the models nancing frictions, I
will develop more theoretical insight about how these frictions a¤ect the dynamics. I start
with the borrowers and entrepreneurs in partial equilibrium. Finally I bring them together
and discuss some general equilibrium considerations.
2.4.1 Borrowers
The rst order conditions for the borrowers problem are:
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cbo;t : bo;t = c
(c
c
bo;th
h
bo;t(1  nbo;t)n)1 
cbo;t
; (37)
"bo;t :  bo;t = bo;t

RP 0("bo;t)
G0("bo;t)

 bo;tefpbo;t; (38)
lbot : bo;t = 
boRt+1Etbo;t+1efpbo;t+1 (39)
hbo;t : qtbo;t =
h
c
cbo;t
hbo;t
bo;t + 
bo(1  h)Etbo;t+1qt+1Ahh("bo;t+1): (40)
nbot :
n
1  nbo;t = c
wt
cbo;t
; (41)
where
Ahh("bo;t) = 1 RP ("bo;t) + efpbo;tG("bo;t):
15 The rst order condition for borrowing has the same form as the savers rst order
condition for deposits except that the e¤ective gross interest rate is nowRt+1efp("bo;t+1)bo;t+1.
efpbo;t =
RP 0("bo;t)
G0("bo;t)
> 1 (42)
is an external nance premium faced by borrowers on loans relative to the risk free interest
rate Rt. We can also think about it as a microfounded intertemporal wedge in the spirit
of Chari et als (2007) [20] Business Cycle Accounting framework. First, hold the loan
enforcement cost parameter bo;t xed.
d
d"bo
(
"f("bo)
1  F ("bo)) > 0
at an optimum implies that efpbo;t is increasing in "bo;t; and therefore in the default rate
F ("bo;t) as well: 16That the external nance premium is increasing in the default rate is
quite intuitive. This relation implies that if we reproduce the countercyclical default rates
found in the data, the model will generate a countercyclical external nance premium. The
link between the two will also allow us to interchangeably interpret any result obtained for
the e¤ect of an increase in the default rate in terms of an increase in the external nance
premium (for a xed bo;t).
15Here and throughout the paper, optimality also requires the transversality conditions to hold. For
debt, this condition is guaranteed to hold for bounded uctuations around the balanced growth path (BGP)
because of the nite BGP debt level.
16Omitting time subscripts, efp0("bo) =
RP 00("bo)G0("bo) RP 0("bo)G00("bo)
G0("bo)2
> 0 i¤ f("bo)2"bo + [1  
F ("bo)]("bof
0("bo) + f("bo)) > 0: This is equivalent to

"bof("bo)
1 F ("bo)
0
> 0:
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An increase in the expected future external nance premium reduces current consumption
relative to future consumption (holding constant labour supply and housing in the case of
nonseparable preferences), just like an increase in the risk free interest rate. From the
banks participation constraint we know that the default rate is increasing in leverage (
"0bo(
Rtlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
) > 0 ). On impact, with lbo;t 1 and hbo;t 1 predetermined, any shock that increases
house prices reduces the loan to collateral ratio. This decreases the default rate, and lowers
the external nance premium. The e¤ect of the shock in the next periods depends on how
borrowers adjust loan demand and housing in response to the shock. With risk neutrality,
the increase in loan demand in response to a positive shock would ultimately lead to a higher
loan to collateral ratio and a higher default rate. But with a diminishing marginal utility of
consumption, this does not have to be the case.
The impatient household behaves like the consumption smoothing patient household with
a bias towards debt nanced consumption instead of saving. For a xed level of nancial
frictions and desired housing, a consumption smoothing borrower reacts to an increase in
wealth by increasing savings. This increase in saving can be accomplished through a combi-
nation of reduced borrowing and increased accumulation of collateral in the form of housing.
At the same time an increase in the value of collateral encourages higher borrowing. If the
rst e¤ect dominates, then the leverage ratio Rtlbo;t 1~Abo;t is countercyclical and therefore the
external nance premium is also countercyclical beyond the initial impact of a shock. The
analysis is similar for a credit shock that directly changes the monitoring cost parameter
bo;t+1; except that now a reduction in the level of nancial frictions is compatible with a
higher leverage. A decline in bo;t+1 directly reduces the external nance premium efpbo;t+1
and raises the leverage ratio. As long as consumption smoothing moderates the agents de-
sire to increase borrowing relative to his collateral, a lower bo;t+1 will reduce the strength
of nancing frictions. The overall e¤ect on leverage is ambiguous.
To highlight the di¤erences and similarities between the model with nancial constraints
and a standard permanent income consumption model, I derive a perfect-foresight consump-
tion function for the special case of log-utility with exogeneous housing and labour supply.
This will also allow me to introduce the credit (or external nancing) spread as an alternative
measure of nancing frictions. By combining the bank loan participation constraint with the
budget constraint, and iterating forward on the resulting expression for lbo;t 1; we obtain
cbo;t =
Rt + sbo;t
1 +
P1
j=1 
bojjk=1
Rt+kefpbo;t+k
Rt+k+sbo;t+k
1X
j=0
nbo;t+jwt+j   qt+jIhbo;t+j
jk=0(Rt+k + sbo;t+k)
(43)
  (Rt + sbo;t)lbo;t 1
1 +
P1
j=1 
bojjk=1
Rt+kefpbo;t+k
Rt+k+sbo;t+k
; where
sbo;t+k =
bo;t+k ~Abo;t+k
R "bo;t+k
0
"dFbo
lbo;t+k 1
: (44)
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sbo;t+k is a credit spread compensating the lender for the cost of default. Financial
frictions a¤ect consumption by modifying the e¤ective interest rates facing the household
through factors that depend on default thresholds "bo;t+k (or equivalently on default rates
for xed idiosyncratic risk distributions and enforcement cost parameter bo). They also
a¤ect consumption decisions through the loan balance from the previous period lbo;t 1: The
consumption function without nancial frictions can be obtained by setting efpbo;t+k = 1
and sbo;t+k = 0 for all periods. The credit spread sbo;t+k is increasing in "bo;t+k as long as
it is lower than (efpbo;t+k   1)R:17 This condition holds in a neighbourhood of the steady
state. Increasing external nance premia efpbo;t+k reduce the present value of the households
wealth net of housing investments, which leads to a reduction in consumption. The e¤ect of
changes in future credit spreads is more ambiguous. On one hand higher sbo;t+ks reduce the
present value of future income net of housing investment. On the other hand they reduce
the e¤ect of higher efpbo;t+k on the present value of that future income. Finally increases
in lbo;t 1 or sbo;t reduce consumption by raising the households debt burden. While these
e¤ects are conditional on a xed level of housing investment and labour supply, the estimated
dynamics below conrm that there is a negative link between default risk, debt repayments
and borrower consumption.
Financial frictions also distort the households choice between housing and non durable
consumption. In a neighbourhood of the steady state Ahh("bo;t+1) is greater than one in the
rst order condition for hbo;t. This makes the marginal value of housing investment more
sensitive to the future expected value of housing than in the model without nancing frictions.
The e¤ect of a change in the expected future external nance premium is less clear-cut. For
a given expected house price appreciation an increase in the expected future default rate
(and hence in the external nance premium) increases the value of housing as collateral. 18
Fixing consumption across periods, this makes the borrowers housing investment increasing
in the expected external nance premium. At the same time, there is an indirect e¤ect
of nancing frictions on housing investment through the the interaction of these frictions
with the marginal utility of consumption bo;t. From the rst order condition for loans, a
reduction in the future external nance premium reduces the e¤ective discount rate applied
to housing investment (
bo
t+1
bot
increases). This encourages the household to increase its housing
stock when the expected external nance premium declines. In the special case when agents
have perfect foresight, the relationship between the expected external nance premium and
17Using the bank participation constraint, R+s("bo)R =
RP ("bo)
G("bo)
: sbo("bo) is increasing in "bo i¤
d
d"bo

R+ s("bo)
R

=
RP 0("bo)G("bo) RP ("bo)G0("bo)
G("bo)2
> 0
i¤ R+s("bo)R =
RP ("bo)
G("bo)
< RP
0("bo)
G0("bo)
= efp("bo); that is i¤ s("bo) < R(efp("bo)  1).
18 d
d"bo
( "f("bo)1 F ("bo) ) > 0 implies that Ahh("bo;t+1) is increasing in "bo;t+1 :
d(Ahh("bo;t))
d"bo;t
= [ RP 0("bo;t) +
G0("bo;t)efp("bo;t) +G("bo;t)efp0("bo;t)] = G("bo;t)efp0("bo;t) > 0:
18
the housing to non durable consumption ratio hbo;t
cbo;t
can be easily determined . Combining
the loan and housing rst order conditions we obtain:
Proposition 1 With perfect foresight, @(hbo;t=cbo;t)
@"bo;t+1
< 0:
Proof. See appendix A.
This implies that the borrowers housing investment is decreasing in the external nance
premium if consumption is also decreasing in the external nance premium. Due to certainty
equivalence, the proposition also holds in a linear approximation of the dynamics. In general
case of aggregate uncertainty and nonlinear approximation, we cannot determine analytically
which e¤ect dominates. But the perfect foresight result should be a good guide for small
levels of aggregate uncertainty.
Finally nancial frictions distort borrowerslabour supply through their e¤ect on non-
durable consumption. For example, if the cost of external nancing declines in a boom
borrowers increase their nondurable consumption by more than savers, and their labour sup-
ply will increase by less than that of savers. Intuitively, better external nancing conditions
act like an increase in borrower wealth, reducing labour supply.
2.4.2 Entrepreneurs
As for the borrowers, we can use the relation between the Lagrange multiplier on the bank
participation constraint and the marginal utility of consumption to obtain the following rst
order conditions for the entrepreneurs:
ce;t :
1
ce;t
= e;t (45)
"e;t :  e;t = e;t
RP 0("e;t)
G0("e;t)
 e;tefpet: (46)
le;t : e;t = 
eRt+1Ete;t+1efpe;t+1: (47)
ke;t+1 : e;tq
k
t = 
eEte;t+1[Akk("e;t+1)q
k
t+1(1  e;t+1) + Aky("e;t+1)
ye;t+1
ke;t+1
]: (48)
ne;t : Aky("e;t)(1  ) ye;t
ne;t
= (1  a+ aefpe;t)wt (49)
ue;t : Aky("e;t)
ye;t
ke;t
= eAkk("e;t)e;tq
k
t ; (50)
where
Akk("e;t) = 1 + efpe;tG("e;t) RP ("e;t) and (51)
Aky("e;t) = 1 + (1  sy)[efpe;tG("e;t) RP ("e;t)]:
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The analysis of these equations parallels in many respects the previous analysis for bor-
rowing households. The key modication of entrepreneur behaviour relative to a standard
nancially unconstrained rm comes through the evolution of the external nance premium
on the bank loan, efpe;t+1 which is increasing in the default threshold "e;t+1: As for house-
holds, we can dene a credit spread
se;t =
e;t ~Ae;t
R "e;t
0
"dFe
le;t 1 + awtne;t
: (52)
This spread is increasing in "e;t in a neighbourhood of the steady state. The default threshold
is increasing in the loan to collateral ratio. The rst order condition for loans implies that
an increase in the expected future external nance premium reduces current consumption
relative to future consumption for the entrepreneur. Consider a boom that raises the entre-
preneurs collateral. In response to an increase in the value of collateral, on one hand the
entrepreneur wants to expand his loan. This tends to raise efpe;t+1. On the other hand the
entrepreneur will smooth changes in his consumption by moderating the increase in the loan
and by raising investment in the collateral asset, capital. This tends to reduce efpe;t+1:The
e¤ect of changes in e;t+1 is also similar to the e¤ect of changes in householdsbo;t+1: The
impact of nancing frictions on investment and labour demand can be approximated by the
following results for small levels of uncertainty :
Proposition 2 a) With perfect foresight and xed capital utilisation, @ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0 for xed
employment. With xed capital utilisation and variable employment @ne;t
d"e;t
< 0 is a su¢ cient
condition for @ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0 :
b) With xed capital utilisation, a  1  sy implies that @ne;t@"e;t < 0:
c) sy > 0 implies
@ue;t
@"e;t
< 0:
Proof. See appendix A.
Start with the rst part of the proposition on investment. Consider an increase in the
future external nance premium. This raises the entrepreneurs e¤ective discount rate for
investment Rt+1efpe;t+1 : Because of diminishing marginal productivity of capital, the higher
discount rate reduces the entrepreneurs desired capital investment. At the same time, an
increase in the future external nance premium also raises the marginal value of capital as
collateral. 19 This tends to raise desired investment: The proposition states that the rst
e¤ect dominates and investment is decreasing in the future external nance premium.
The labour demand decision of entrepreneurs is directly distorted by nancing frictions
as long as sy < 1 or a > 0: In the presence of working capital requirements on wages (a > 0),
a higher external nance premium acts as a tax on hiring and lowers labour demand. At
the same time, if revenue can be used as collateral (sy < 1), then an increase in the external
19Akk("e;t+1) is increasing in "e;t+1; and "e;t+1 is increasing in efpe;t+1.
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nance premium raises the value of labour as an input into the collateral that can be o¤ered
by the entrepreneur. This tends to stimulate labour demand in response to a higher external
nance premium. The proposition says that labour demand must decrease in the level of
nancing frictions if the wages in advance requirement is strong enough or if revenue is
relatively hard to collateralize.
The capital utilisation rate is decreasing in the external nance premium for sy > 0:
With capital easier to collateralise than revenue (sy > 0), an increase in the external nance
premium encourages the entrepreneur to reduce the depreciation rate of valuable collateral.
This can be achieved by decreasing the utilisation rate. In addition, the nancing frictions
will a¤ect the entrepreneursutilisation rate decision indirectly. A decline in the external
nance premium stimulates labour demand This increases the marginal product of capital
which in turn increases the desired capital utilisation rate. In the other direction, if a
lower external nance premium stimulates entrepreneur demand for capital, then in general
equilibrium this leads to a higher price of capital. The higher price of capital reduces capital
utilisation by making it more costly to depreciate existing capital.
2.4.3 Some General Equilibrium Considerations
Here, I focus on some specic issues arising from the joint modeling of rm and household bor-
rowing constraints. One question highlighted in the introduction is whether the incorporation
of more pervasive nancing constraints a¤ecting both rms and households could increase
the importance of these frictions in amplifying the response of macroeconomic quantities to
shocks. The possibility for interactions can be seen from the bank break-even constraint for
the loan to entrepreneurs:
G("e;t) =
Rtle;t 1 + awtne;t
(1  e;t)qkt ke;t + (1  sy)ye;t
, (53)
G0("e;t) > 0:
This equation shows that in general equilibrium changes in the nancing conditions of
borrowers a¤ect rmsleverage and external nancing conditions through their e¤ect on the
risk-free interest rate, wages and demand for rmsgoods.
Consider a negative shock that increases nancial frictions for households (for example
by depressing house prices that serve as collateral for loans). Traditional Keynesian analysis
would suggest a positive interaction between the strength of nancing frictions a¤ecting
households and rms. Higher credit spreads for households reduce their consumption which
may depress the sales of some rms and raise their credit spreads. Even though my model has
exible prices and wages, a reduction in sales of consumption goods to borrowing households
could depress output and indirectly increase rmsexternal nancing spreads if investment
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adjustment costs limit reallocation of resources between the production of consumption and
investment goods. 20
In the other direction there are several channels for negative interaction between house-
hold and rm credit frictions. An increase in the external nancing spread reduces house-
holdsdemand for loans for any given risk free interest rate. By the loan market equilibrium
condition,
sd(Rt+1; ) = bolbo(sbo;t+1; t+1; Rt+1; ) + le(se;t+1; t+1; Rt+1; ); (54)
this puts downward pressure on the risk-free rate interest rate. From the bank loan partic-
ipation constraint above, this reduces nancing spreads for entrepreneurs. Now consider the
e¤ect of this negative shock on labour supply and wages. Higher spreads reduce borrowers
current consumption and increase their desired labour supply. Absent opposing movements
in the labour supply of savers, aggregate labour supply will increase due to the increase in
household external nancing spreads, leading to a lower wage rate for rms. Movements
in the risk free interest rate in the model with household borrowing frictions will tend to
dampen the decline in saversconsumption and increase the fall in their labour supply in
a recession. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of household nancing frictions on labour supply
may seem ambiguous. However, by aggregating over the labour supply of the two types of
households we nd that
1 N st = s(1  ns;t) + bo(1  nbo;t) = s
ncs;t
cwt
+ bo
ncbo;t
cwt
=
n
cwt
Chholdst ;(55)
where Chholdst = scs;t + bocbo;t:
The aggregate labour supply equation above implies that as long as increasing household
nancing frictions generate a bigger decline in aggregate household consumption Chholdst ;
they will raise labour supply and reduce the wage rate faced by rms. Going back to
the break-even constraint on entrepreneur borrowing, this reduction in the wage improves
entrepreneur nancing conditions by reducing borrowing for the wage bill and stimulating
entrepreneur output. For our parameter values, higher nancing spreads in a recession tend
to decrease aggregate household consumption and increase labour supply. This generates
another channel for negative interaction between credit conditions for households and rms.
20Note that entrepreneurs in our model produce a general good ye;t. This implicitly means that an
entrepreneur facing lower demand from borrowing households in the model can easily switch to producing
other goods for other customers. In reality, many rms may be specialised in consumption goods, and their
nancing spreads may be more directly linked to sales to borrowing households. This channel is missing
from the current model, but it may be worthwhile to explore in future work.
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3 Estimation and Quantitative Results
I solve the model using a loglinear approximation around the deterministic balanced
growth path (henceforth the BGP). I use a mixture of calibration and Bayesian estimation
to obtain parameter values. 21 Since the loglinearised model is in state space form, we
can evaluate its likelihood p(Y jp) using the Kalman lter. The posterior density of the
parameters p(pjY ) is then proportional to the product of the likelihood function and the
prior density of the parameters p(Y jp)(p). I follow the standard practice of rst nding
the mode of the posterior density using a robust optimisation algorithm. Then, I use the
resulting mode and covariance matrix estimates to run a random walk Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulation. The output of the MCMC simulation approximates the pos-
terior distribution of the parameters, allowing me to form probability intervals around the
parameters and functions of the parameters such as variance decompositions. 22
I estimate the model using quarterly US data from 1955:Q1 to 2004:Q4. This sample
avoids the Korean war and immediate transition phase from World war 2, as well the most
recent nancial crisis that may be hard to model with the loglinear approximation used in
estimation. There are 3 shocks in the model: the TFP shock, the investment shock and
the credit shock. Therefore, I can use 3 time series while avoiding stochastic singularity. I
use real consumption on nondurables and services, real private non residential investment
and real residential investment. I dene the GDP measure in the data corresponding to
the models economy to be the sum of these variables. This is in line with my omission
of government and consumer durables from the model. All of these series are obtained by
dividing nominal data by the GDP implicit price deator and the civilian non institutional
population over the age of 16 (see the appendix for more information on the data). I take
21Bayesian estimation has become the method of choice for inference on DSGE models (see An and
Schorheide (2007) [3] for a survey). This partly reects the attractiveness of quantifying the uncertainty in a
policy oriented model in terms of posterior probabilities as opposed to classical condence intervals. It also
reects the di¢ culty of direct application of maximum likelihood methods to highly misspecied models.
Regardless of model misspecication, under mild regularity conditions and as long as the model is identied,
the Bayes estimator converges asymptotically to the maximum likelihood estimator, and the e¤ect of the
priors vanishes. In nite samples, the priors will of course still a¤ect the estimation. This can be seen as
a disadvantage, but at the same time it allows the researcher to introduce information from other sources
that may be hard to directly incorporate in maximum likelihood estimation.
22After detrending all variables by the BGP growth rate of output, I use Kleins (2000) [43] generalised
Schur decomposition method to solve for the loglinear approximation. I have also explored the e¤ects of
using second order perturbation methods as in Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2004) [34]. While there is some
evidence of nonlinearity, it does not appear strong enough to justify the signicantly larger computational
burden of replacing the Kalman lter by a nonlinear particle lter in estimation. I use the Covariance Matrix
Adaptation Evolutionary Strategy algorithm (CMAES) to maximise the posterior p(pjY ). As documented
by Andreasen (2008) [4] for DSGE models, this algorithm has excellent global optimisation properties while
being signicantly faster than other common alternatives such as simulated annealing. Given the global
nature of the algorithm, I perform 10 optimisation runs and pick the best, using the prior distribution to
pick su¢ ciently dispersed starting points.
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out a separate linear trend and a sample average from the natural logarithm of each variable
to match the corresponding variables in the models state-space representation. I calibrate
the nancial contract parameters, the preference parameters and discount factors to match
long run averages and micro evidence. These parameters are often hard to identify with
only aggregate macroeconomic quantity data, and the calibration allows me to incorporate
information from micro data and studies to identify them. I estimate the two investment
adjustment cost parameters and the exogenous shock process parameters. 23 I run three
chains of 500,000 draws each, starting from the posterior mode and the posterior mode +/-
2 standard deviations. I drop the rst 40% of the draws for each chain as a burn-in, and
mix all the remaining draws for inference on the posterior. This gives me a nal sample of
900,000 draws. 24
3.1 Calibrated Parameters
I calibrate the parameters of the model controlling balanced growth path ratios to long
run averages of the US economy at a quarterly frequency (table 1).The curvature coe¢ cient
of the utility function  is set to 2, which is in line with the empirical upper bounds on relative
risk aversion established in Chetty (2006) [21] and the estimates in Basu and Kimball (2002)
[8]. The results are qualitatively quite similar in the common case of log utility ( = 1). The
patient householdsdiscount factor  is set to match an average annual real risk-free rate of
4%: This is a common choice in the macroeconomic literature. While it is higher than the
average rate of return on US 3 months T-bill rate, it matches the rate of return on longer
term US T-bonds which as argued by McGrattan and Prescott (2003) [48] is free of liquidity
premia and transaction costs considerations that are not modelled here. The housing and
consumption share parameters in the utility function h and c are set to deliver an annual
housing stock to output ratio of around 1.3 as in Davis and Heathcote (2005) [26] and an
hours of work share of 0.32. The measure of GDP in the data most close to my model is the
sum of consumption expenditures on nondurables and services, private residential investment
23The nancial contract parameters should be well identied in the Bayesian estimation, if I included
nancial time series in my estimation data. To do this I would have to add more shock processes , enrich the
nancial shock processes with news on future shocks as in Christiano et al (2010) [23], or I would have to add
measurement errors. While adding more variables to the estimation is certainly a worthwhile and relatively
straightforward extension, I have opted to start with a minimal shock structure, relying on calibration (a
rough method of moments) to incorporate additional information such as average leverage ratios or default
rates.
24Using a scaling factor for the covariance matrix of 2:38
2
dim(p)
(see Rosenthal (2010) [52] for a justication
of this choice); leads to an acceptance rate for the draws of around 27%. This is close to the recommended
acceptance rate. My computation of the posterior assumes that all draws lead to a unique rational expec-
tations solution. This was the case for 99.95% of the draws. Convergence to the posterior was assessed by
examining the recursive means of the draws in each chain and by comparing the variance of the draws in
the mixed overall chain to the average variance within the chains as in Gelman and Shirley (2010) [31]. In
all cases, the results suggested convergence of the chains.
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and private non residential investment. Based on this measure and my estimation sample
period I nd an average quarterly growth rate of GDP of .51%, leading to Gy = 1:0051: I
set the returns to scale parameter  = 0:95, as in Atkeson and Kehoe (2007) [6]: The capital
share  is set to target a BGP rm investment to output ratio of 0.153, the average of the
ratio of private non residential investment to model GDP over my sample of 1955-2004.
For the depreciation rates on housing and business capital I rely on the BEA data for 1948-
2001 in Davis and Heathcote (2005) [26]. Therefore, I set h = 0:016=4 and e = 0:056=4:
Combining this with the rst order condition for the capital utilisation rate in the BGP xes
e; the curvature of the capital depreciation function:
We now come to the parameters related to the nancial frictions. I set the share of
impatient households at 40%, based on the proportion of US households with negative net
nancial assets reported in Scoccianti (2009) [53] and Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2010) [27].
This number is a bit higher than that used in models with rule of thumb households that
consume all their income or in models using the Iacoviello framework, but my denition of
being credit constrained is weaker than the quantity rationing imposed in those models.
I set the share of wages that must be paid in advance to 50% (a = 0:5), halfway between
the typical assumption of models with this channel that all wages must be paid in advance
and the other extreme that all wages can be paid out of realised revenue. For the proportion
of revenue that can be collateralised I start with sy = 0:5 as a benchmark. This is the
midpoint between 2 extremes that are common in the literature: one in which only capital
can be seized as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)[42], and one in which all revenue can be seized
as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) [16].
A priori it is not clear whether collateral liquidation or foreclosure costs are higher on
consumer or rm debt: one can envision more e¢ cient mechanisms for resolving rm default
proceedings, but on other hand rms are more complex entities with higher possibilities
for fraud. For now, I set bo = e = : I calibrate the discount factors of borrowers and
entrepreneurs, the loss proportion of a bank in default  and the volatilities of idiosyncratic
shocks e and bo to match rm and household leverage ratios, the credit spread on rm
borrowing, and rm and household default rates. Covas and Den Haan (2010) [24] report
an average debt to assets ratio for nonnancial Compustat corporations of 0.587 over 1971-
2004. I use this as my rm leverage target. For the borrowing householdsleverage target, I
use the average loan to value ratio on single family conventional mortgages over 1973-2006 of
0.76 (Iacoviello and Neri 2009) [38]. I target an annual spread on rm borrowing of around
1.27%. This is close to the estimated value of the credit spread for the US in De Graeve
(2008) [33] using the BGG model. I reach this number by taking the average spread between
the prime loan rate and the 3 month commercial paper rate over 1971-1996 as in Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) [15]and adjusting it by a factor of 68% to better reect the component
due to default risk. This is in the middle of the range of the proportion of corporate bond
spreads accounted for by default risk as computed in Longsta¤ et al (2005) [47]. For rms,
I target the 3% average annual default rate on US bonds over 1971-2005 (Fuentes-Albero
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(2009) [29]). For households, I interpret default in the model to be similar to foreclosure
on a mortgage in the data. I use the average annual foreclosure rate of 1:4% in 1990-2004
from Garriga and Shlagenhauf (2009) [30] to calibrate the BGP default rate households. To
match these targets, I set
 = 0:45; bo = 0:949 ; e = 0:95; e = 0:209; bo = 0:099:
These parameter values generate an annual spread on household loans of around 0.6%. In
comparison, the actual spread between the typical 30 year xed rate mortgage and a 30
year government bond over 1977-2008 was 1.5% (Sommer et al 2009) [56]. Matching a
higher spread for households with the lower default rate than that of rms would require
us to assume an implausibly low discount factor bo or to calibrate a separate monitoring
parameter bo signicantly above 0.5, which is again implausible. This suggests that there
are other unmodeled factors accounting for most of the interest rate spread on consumer
mortgages.
3.2 Prior Distribution for Estimated Parameters
Table 2 describes the prior and posterior distributions. For most parameters I use priors
consistent with earlier studies (e.g Justiniano et al (2009) [41]). The capital investment
adjustment cost parameter  follows a Gamma distribution with a mean of 4 and a standard
deviation of 1. For the shock persistence parameters z; ; I I use a Beta distribution with a
mean of 0.75 and a standard deviation of 0.15. I use a uniform distribution on [0; 0:05] for the
standard deviation of the innovations to TFP and to the price of investment goods, z and
I . For the housing investment adjustment cost parameter h there is less prior information
I use a Gamma distribution with a mean of 1 (in line with the estimates in Topel and Rosen
(1988) [57]), and a standard deviation of 0.5. Finally, I use a uniform distribution on [0; 0:5]
for the credit shock standard deviation : This reects the high level of uncertainty on this
parameter, given the small number of previous papers allowing for this shock. 25
3.3 Posterior Distribution of the Estimated Parameters
I will focus on the posterior mode estimates, since the posterior means and medians are very
similar to the modes. In general, the data appear to be informative about the estimated
parameters. While for some parameter the posterior mode is close to the prior mean, the
posterior probability intervals are signicantly tighter than the prior intervals for all para-
meters . The estimated investment adjustment cost ^ of around 4 is lower than that in other
estimated models with nancial frictions, where it ranges from around 6 (De Graeve (2008)
25To my knowledge the only other papers estimating this sort of credit shock to t are Levin and Natalucci
(2004) using US rm level data and BGGs model of nancing frictions, and Fuentes-Alberos estimation of
the BGG model (2009) [29].
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[33]) to around 30 (Christiano et al (2010) [23]) . 26This probably reects the fact that I only
use aggregate quantities as data, while De Graeve also includes interest rates and Christiano
et al add the stock market to their observable variables. The di¤erence in estimates is a
symptom of the tension with investment or capital adjustment costs between matching asset
price volatility and matching the volatility of investment. The estimated housing investment
adjustment costs ^h = 0:178 are signicantly below the prior mean. This is necessary to
allow the model to match the very high volatility (around 14% per quarter) of residential in-
vestment. As in most DSGE models, we need relatively persistent shock processes to match
the data, with persistence parameters ranging from ^I = 0:86 for the investment shock to
^ = 0:97 for the credit shock. The volatility of the TFP shock innovation ^z = 0:51% is
signicantly below the volatility of 0:7  1% typically used in calibrated real business cycle
models. Finally the credit shock is extremely volatile with ^ = 23:2%: In the rst order
approximation,
t+1   

' 
t   

+ (1  )";t: (56)
A 1 standard deviation shock to the t process increases t by approximately 13:61%:
Starting at the balanced growth path, this would raise the proportion of collateral the bank
loses in default from  = 0:45 to t = 0:511: While this change still seems like a large
number, note that it applies only to the approximately 0:26%   0:41% of borrowersassets
that are seized in default procedures every quarter. Therefore, the overall direct impact on
the leverage ratio of borrowers is not that large. 27
3.4 The E¤ect of Aggregate Shocks
Here I use impulse response function analysis and variance decomposition to examine the
e¤ect of shocks hitting the economy. To isolate the e¤ect of nancial frictions, I also plot the
responses of the economy when shutting down the nancial frictions. I compare the model
with all nancing frictions (blue circles), only rm nancing frictions (green stars), only
household nancing frictions (red diamonds) and the model without any nancing frictions
(light green/turquoise crosses) at the posterior mode parameter values. There are several
conclusions we can draw from this exercise. First, TFP shocks are still central to generating
business cycles. Second, nancial shocks have di¢ culty in generating big recession on their
own. Third, in general equilibrium worse credit frictions for households tend to reduce
credit frictions for rms, though other common factors lead to comovement between rm
26Liu et al. (2010) [46] estimate ^ of only 0.19 in a model with collateral constrained entrepreneurs, but
they assume a xed stock of structures (innite adjustment costs), and dene investment as the sum of
equipment investment and durable consumption.
27To the degree that t in the model is a general measure of the e¢ ciency of the nancial system in dealing
with distressed loans, beyond pure bankruptcy costs, it is di¢ cult to judge the economic plausibility of this
volatility based on purely microeconomic evidence. Fuentes - Albero (2009) [29] incorporates shocks to t
in the BGG framework. She nds a volatility of these shocks that is even higher.
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and household credit spreads. Fourth, household credit frictions have di¢ culty in generating
bigger uctuations in housing investment and prices.
3.4.1 Total Factor Productivity and Investment Shocks
Consider a 1 standard deviation decline in TFP. This leads to a decline in output, consump-
tion, rm investment and residential investment (gure 1). Firm nancing frictions amplify
the response of business investment and consumption. Comparing the model with only rm
nancing frictions to the frictionless model, the absolute value of the percentage deviation
from the BGP of investment is 34% - 85% higher, and the absolute value of the percentage
deviation of consumption is 30% - 80% higher during the rst 10 periods after the shock.
Firm nancing frictions dampen the response of housing investment in the initial periods
after a shock. For the rst 5 periods the absolute value of the percentage deviation from the
BGP of residential investment is around 50% lower in the model with rm nancing con-
straints. The overall result is that except on impact nancial frictions reduce the response
of output to a TFP shock, though there is signicant initial output amplication if we look
at total value added omitting the deadweight costs of nancing frictions (gure 2). 28
The entrepreneurs external nance premium increases strongly on impact because the
loan is predetermined and the decline in productivity reduces the value of the entrepreneurs
collateral by decreasing revenue and the value of the entrepreneurs capital stock (gure
2). In subsequent periods consumption smoothing prevents entrepreneurs from reducing
their borrowing 1 to 1 with their collateral. This increases the entrepreneurs leverage,
external nancing spread (gure 4), and external nancing premium (gure 2). The spread
returns gradually to its long run value as the entrepreneur reduces his borrowing and the
price of capital climbs back to its steady state value. The increase in the external nance
premium and the entrepreneurs desire to smooth consumption reduce investment. The
higher nancing frictions also forces the entrepreneur to signicantly decrease consumption.
29 The strong e¤ect of changes in nancing conditions on investment has an indirect general
equilibrium impact on the entrepreneurs capital utilisation decision. The bigger drop in
investment in the economy with rm nancing constraints leads to a bigger decline in the
price of capital. This reduces the cost of using capital more intensively. As a result capital
utilisation is less procyclical with rm nancing constraints (gure 2), which helps explain
why these constraints dont amplify the response of output to the shock.
Borrowing households also su¤er from increasing external nancing spreads (gures 3
and 4). The decline in the demand for housing lowers house prices and reduces the value
of their collateral. To smooth their consumption, these households reduce their borrow-
ing by less than the decline in their collateral. This leads to higher leverage and nancing
28These costs increase in a TFP shock driven recession as default rates go up.
29The strong reaction of entrepreneur consumption is in line with micro evidence that consumption of the
wealthiest households in the US is much more procyclical than that of other households (Parker and Vissing
Jorgensen (2009) [50]).
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frictions, though here the e¤ect is less persistent than for entrepreneurs. The worsening
nancial condition of borrowers reduces their consumption and housing investment signi-
cantly more than those of nancially unconstrained households (who actually increase their
housing investment). It also increases borrowerslabour supply.
The overall e¤ect of adding household nancing frictions seems to be a modest reduc-
tion in the impact of rm nancing frictions on aggregate investment and output. Moving
from the economy with only rm nancing constraints to the economy with all nancing
constraints reduces the magnitude of the decline in investment (measured by the percentage
deviation from the BGP) by around 11%, and the magnitude of the decline in output by
around 5% - 8% during the rst 10 periods after a shock. The increase in borrowerslabour
supply and the reduction in their demand for loans improve rms nancing conditions
indirectly by lowering wages and reducing the risk free interest rate. As a result, the entre-
preneursexternal nance premium percentage deviation from the BGP increases by around
6 - 11% less during the rst 10 periods in the economy with household credit constraints.
The e¤ect on aggregate quantities is modest because saversconsumption declines less, and
savers labour supply declines more in the economy with both types of credit constraints
relative to the economy with only rm credit constraints.
Household nancing frictions in the model do not amplify movement in housing invest-
ment or house prices (gure 1). On the other hand, rm nancing frictions do have a
signicant impact on the behaviour of residential investment. In their presence, residential
investment responds signicantly less to a negative TFP shock on impact, but its decline
is more persistent. The weaker decline in residential investment in the economy with rm
nancing frictions is explained by the smaller increase in the risk free interest rate in compar-
ison to the economy with nancially unconstrained producers. This relative decrease in the
interest rate (the return on saving through market loans or capital) generates an incentive to
increase saving in the form of housing (non-market capital) relative to the nancially uncon-
strained production economy. The relative decline in interest rate can be traced back to the
no arbitrage relation between the entrepreneurs return on capital and the risk free interest.
Consider for simplicity the special case of perfect foresight and sy = 0: The entrepreneurs
rst order condition for capital is
Rt+1R
ke("et+1) =
(1  e;t+1)qkt+1 +  ye;t+1ke;t+1
qkt
; (57)
where Rke0("et+1) > 0:
The recession increases the default probability of entrepreneurs (a higher "e;t+1) and raises
the e¤ective discount rate for investment (Rke("e;t+!)) , which tends to reduce Rt+1: 30 As
for household nancing frictions, it is true that on impact borrowers dramatically reduce
30The same e¤ect holds when sy > 0; except now the capital gain component
(1 e)qkt+1
qkt
and the dividend
component  ye;t+1
qkt ke;t+1
of the return on capital investment no longer have exactly the same e¤ective discount
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their housing investment. But savers increase their housing investment signicantly, so that
in aggregate housing investment is barely a¤ected by the presence of borrowers (in fact its
slightly less responsive to TFP shocks). Aggregate housing investment adjustment costs and
the decline in borrower and aggregate housing investment induce an initial decline in house
prices, which is reversed over time as the economy converges back to the BGP. Unlike for
borrowers, savershousing investment decisions are purely a function of interest rates and
house prices. The upward sloping path of house prices together with the smaller increase
in the risk free interest rate in the economy with household borrowers encourages savers to
initially expand their housing stock in a TFP shock recession. 31
Figure 5 displays the response of the model economy to an investment shock. The impact
of investment shocks on output and investment are dampened by rm credit constraints, as
in other models of nancial frictions (e.g De Graeve (2008) [33]). An increase in the relative
price of investment in the model pushes up the price of capital and reduces investment as in
a frictionless model. But the higher price of capital raises the value of entrepreneur collateral
and reduces the nancing frictions that they face (gure 6). As a result consumption actually
increases and investment declines by less. Our disaggregation of the capital stock into housing
and business capital also reveals that the investment shock produces counterfactual negative
comovement between business investment and both consumption and residential investment.
The addition of nancing frictions reduces the negative comovement between residential and
non residential investment signicantly, but does not eliminate it.
3.4.2 Credit Shocks
A 1 standard deviation increase in the cost of monitoring distressed loans t+1 generates
a signicant hump shaped decline in investment peaking at -1.5% (gure 7). Aggregate
consumption declines initially by around 0.4% and then recovers, though it is still below
the BGP for several more periods. Residential investment actually increases by up to 4%,
leading to an increase in house prices. The strong increase in housing investment means
that the decline in output due to the credit shock is quite small (at most around -0.1% if
measured from the production function, or -0.3% if measured using total value added that
rate. The interest rate in both economies is countercyclical for productivity shocks because of the presence
of investment adjustment costs. These adjustment costs induce procyclical movements in the price of capital
that by the no arbitrage condition between capital and nancial loans increase the risk free interest rate in
a recession and decrease it in a boom.
31The size of swings in agentshousing investment may seem surprising at rst. However, note that agents
care about the stock of housing, which given its very low depreciation rate is barely a¤ected even by large
swings in agentshousing investment. For example if housing investment of savers drops to 0 in a period,
this leads to a decline in their housing stock of only 0.4%. Given this insensitivity of the housing stock to
housing investment, agents are willing to allow signicant adjustment in housing investment in response to
small changes in the path of interest rates and house prices. Also note that since the economy is stationary
around the BGP with a constant housing stock (after detrending by the BGP growth factor), any increase
in the housing stock above the BGP level must be matched by a reduction in the housing stock of an agent
in future periods.
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excludes the deadweight cost of nancing frictions). Certainly, we are far from generating
the deep recession typically associated with a credit crunch.
To understand the aggregate e¤ects of a credit shock I start with the behaviour of en-
trepreneurs (gure 8). For entrepreneurs, a rise in default monitoring costs increases credit
frictions. Both the credit spread and the external nance increase and borrowing declines
signicantly. The entrepreneur responds by reducing investment and consumption. In gen-
eral equilibrium the decline in investment depresses the price of capital and lowers the value
of collateral. This leads to a further rise in the external nancing spread. It also tends to
increase leverage, while the direct e¤ect of higher monitoring costs is to lower leverage (gure
10). The tension between these two e¤ects means that leverage rises in the rst periods of
the shock before declining.
Now consider the savers (gure 9). On impact, the fall in the risk-free interest rate
encourages savers to substitute from nancial assets towards housing as an alternative form
of saving. The decline in interest rates also stimulates saversconsumption and reduces their
labour supply. As the interest rate converges back to its BGP value, saversconsumption
and housing investment decline.
Next, add the borrowers to the picture (gure 9). If we examine a model where some
households are credit constrained but the production sector is nancially unconstrained,
the credit shock has virtually no impact on aggregates. While monitoring costs increase,
the decline in borrowing is big enough to make the increase in the borrowers external
nance premium tiny. Now drop the borrowing households into an economy with nancially
constrained entrepreneurs. In response to higher monitoring costs the borrowers external
nance premium and credit spread actually decline initially. How is this possible when the
same increase in t+1 has increased the external nancing costs of entrepreneurs? The answer
lies in the di¤erent type of collateral used by these two types of borrowers. Households borrow
against housing. The increase in t+1 generates an increase in housing investment and house
prices. This improves the credit constrained householdscollateral position and reduces their
nancing costs. As a result they increase their consumption and reduce their labour supply.
The prole of the increase in house prices still induces them to reduce housing investment
despite the lower nancing costs.
So far we have explained why housing investment increases by appealing to interest rate
movements. Why does the interest rate decrease sharply on impact? The lower demand for
loans from entrepreneurs reduces the interest rate on deposits, but this was also the case for a
negative TFP shock even though the interest rate actually increased. There is another factor
explaining the bigger decline in interest rates for a credit shock. Interest movements play
an important role in reconciling changes in the demand for the components of GDP and the
supply of output. Because the credit shock does not a¤ect TFP, it puts a bigger burden on
shifts in labour demand and the capital utilisation rate to generate a decline in output. The
need to borrow for wage payments generates a negative link between the external nance
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premium and labour demand that reduces production. At the same time the fall in the
price of capital reduces the cost in depreciated capital of a higher capital utilisation rate.
This encourages an increase in the capital utilisation rate that raises production (gure 8).
The direct e¤ect of rising nancing spreads on labour demand is not enough to counter the
change in capital utilisation, so that the overall response of output (and value added) is weak.
The resource constraint of the economy implies that the weak response of output and the
strong decline in rm investment must lead to compensating increases in either consumption
or residential investment. In equilibrium this requires a decline in the risk free interest
rate, which given the higher sensitivity of residential investment to interest rates leads to a
housing boom in the middle of the recession. We can eliminate the comovement problem
between residential and nonresidential investment in response to a credit shock by raising
housing adjustment costs. For example, when increasing h by a factor of 10,000 residential
investment barely increases in the rst periods after a shock, and it declines a bit in latter
periods. But the response of output to a higher t+1 is still economically insignicant with
a maximum decline of 0.15%.
3.4.3 Variance Decomposition
I examine the contribution of each shock to the long run variance of macroeconomic quantities
and nancial variables at the posterior mode of the parameters. I follow the advice of
Canova (1998) [14] in examining the results for several common denitions of the trend.
Table 3 reports the variance decomposition of the linearly detrended variables in levels
(the closest to the denition of uctuations in the original state-space representation of
the model), growth rates of variables and HP ltered variables (a common denition of
business cycle frequencies). The TFP shock accounts for 71% - 73.9% of the variance of
output and 56.1 - 69.4% of the variance of consumption. However it only accounts for 9.3%
- 18.6% of the variance of non-residential investment and 7.2% - 11.3% of the variance of
residential investment, implying that the other shocks are also important in accounting for
aggregate uctuations. Investment shocks explain 66.6% - 77.4% of the variance of non-
residential investment and 35.5% - 49% of the variance of residential investment. Finally,
nancial shocks explain most of the uctuations in credit spreads, external nance premia
and leverage ratios, but only 4.2% - 10.9% of the variance of output, 10% - 29.6% of the
variance of consumption and 13.3% - 15.7% of investment uctuations. They do explain
39.7% - 53.2% of the variance of residential investment, though the prediction of a strong
increase in housing investment in response to an increase in the loan default cost t that
helps generate this result seems counterfactual.
3.5 Comparing Data and Model Statistics
Here I compare time series moments based on model simulations to US data moments. In
particular I examine the models ability to match the standard deviations of consumption,
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residential and non residential investment and output, as well as some correlations among
these variables over the estimation sample period. I analyse the data in log-levels, in growth
rates and with HP ltering. I simulate time series of the same length as the data (after
dropping some initial observations) for di¤erent draws from the posterior. The model does a
reasonably good job in matching the volatilities of the levels of output, consumption and in-
vestment. All the model based 90% condence intervals contain the data for these variables.
In contrast, the level of housing investment is too volatile relative to the data. The model
does very well in matching the correlations between the levels of consumption, business in-
vestment and consumption, but it does less well in matching some of the correlations between
growth rates or HP ltered variables. One major discrepancy is that the model predicts a
counterfactual negative correlation between residential and non residential investment, re-
gardless of the ltering used. The negative comovement of the two types of investment is
a common problem in DSGE models without adjustment costs (see Davis and Heathcote
(2005) [26] for a discussion and possible solutions ). Moderate investment adjustment costs
were su¢ cient to generate positive comovement for TFP shocks, but this was not the case
for investment and nancial shocks. As for growth rates, the model captures quite well the
volatilities of the residential and non residential investment growth rates, but it predicts a
volatility of consumption growth which is signicantly above what we nd in the data. For
HP ltered variables, the model predicts the magnitude of investment uctuations quite well,
but it overpredicts the volatility of consumption and underpredicts output volatility.
4 Conclusion
I have developed and estimated a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the inter-
action between rm and household debt levels, in an environment with credit default risk and
endogenous leverage ratios for both business and consumer loans. I embedded these nancial
frictions in a real business cycle model with residential and non residential investment. In
this context, I found that total factor productivity shocks are still the main driver of business
cycles in the model, at least for output and consumption. While the nancial shocks as mod-
eled here are important in explaining uctuations in credit spreads and leverage ratios, they
do not produce plausible business cycles on their own. In particular they generate a coun-
terfactual strong negative comovement between residential and nonresidential investment.
This is due to the lack of su¢ cient procyclicality in labour demand and capital utilisation
rates in response to nancial shocks, that limits the ability of these shocks to generate co-
movement in all output components. While the joint consideration of household and rm
nancing frictions allows us to address more empirical facts and provides some interesting
insights, overall allowing for more pervasive nancing frictions did not lead to a bigger am-
plication of the response of output to shocks. In fact, adding household nancing frictions
to an environment with rm nancing frictions dampens the e¤ect of the rm level nancial
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accelerator in the model. Higher external nancing frictions for households encourage them
to reduce their demand for loans and increase their labour supply. In general equilibrium,
these responses of households reduce interest rates and wages, decreasing external nancing
frictions faced by rms.
An interesting extension of the analysis in this paper would investigate the robustness of
the results to a more realistic setup with uninsured idiosyncratic risk. In such an environment
households that are saving are themselves indirectly a¤ected by nancing frictions through
the possibility that they may want to borrow in the future. This leads to precautionary
saving and generates a wedge relative to the complete markets consumption Euler equation
that is similar in some respects to my external nancing premium. 32 In particular it is also
countercyclical, with precautionary saving increasing in a recession. The interaction in debt
markets between household and rm loan demand is also more complex in an economy where
the proportion of borrowing households and rms can change across the business cycle. In
the current model all rms are net borrowers in each period, so that an increase in loan
demand by households in a boom makes things worse for rms by raising their borrowing
costs. In a model with heterogeneous rms, in each period some rms will be net savers. For
these rms, an increase in the risk-free interest rate due to higher loan demand by borrowers
makes it easier to accumulate assets that may relax their future borrowing constraints.
Solving a model where both rms and households are a¤ected by uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks presents signicant di¢ culties using the standard simulation based Krusell and Smith
(1998) [45] algorithm for heterogenous agent models with aggregate uncertainty. However,
this objective may be easier using more recent techniques that reduce the use of simulation
to solve the model (Algan et al. (2009) [2]).
5 Appendix A, proofs of propositions
For convenience, throughout these proofs we will also use H(")   RP ("):
Proposition1: With perfect foresight, @(hbo;t=cbo;t)
@"bo;t+1
< 0:
Proof: With perfect foresight we can combine the loan and the housing Euler equations
to obtain
qt =
h
c
cbo;t
hbo;t
+ (1  h)qt+1 Ahh("bo;t+1)
Rt+1efp("bo;t+1)
:
32See Challe and Ragot (2010) [19] for a derivation of this wedge in a simplied uninsured idiosyncratic
risk model.
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d

Ahh("bo;t+1)
efp("bo;t+1)

d"bo;t+1
=
 efp0(ebo;t+1)
efp2bo;t+1
+ [
H 0("bo;t+1)
efpbo;t+1
+G0("bo;t+1) H("bo;t+1)efp
0("bo;t+1)
efp2bo;t+1
]
=  efp
0("bo;t+1)
efp2bo;t+1
[1 +H("bo;t+1)] < 0;
where the last inequality follows from efp0("bo;t+1) > 0 and H("bo;t+1) >  1: Therefore, an
increase in "bo;t+1 must lead to a rise in
cbo;t
hbo;t
for given house prices.
Proposition 2:a) With perfect foresight and xed capital utilisation, @ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0 for xed
employment. With variable employment @ne;t
d"e;t
< 0 is a su¢ cient condition for @ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0 :
b) With xed capital utilisation, a  1  sy implies that @ne;t@"e;t < 0:
c) @ue;t
@"e;t
< 0:
Proof:a) The proof is similar to that of proposition 1. Combining the loan and capital
Euler equations, we have
qkt =
1
Rt+1efpe;t+1
[Akk("e;t+1)q
k
t+1(1  e) + Aky("e;t+1)
ye;t+1
ke;t+1
]:
Using the fact that Aky("e;t+1)=efp("e;t+1) and Akk("e;t+1)=efp("e;t+1) are both decreasing
in "e;t+1 and the diminishing marginal productivity of capital we nd
@ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0 for xed
ne;t+1: Now allow for variable labour supply with
@ne;t
@"e;t
< 0: Rewrite the rst order condition
for ne;t as
1 + (1  sy)[H("e;t) + efpe;tG("e;t)]
(1  a+ aefpe;t) (1  )
ye;t
ne;t
= wt = Bne("e;t)(1  )
ye;t
ne;t
= wt:
By diminishing marginal productivity of labour, @ne;t
@"e;t
< 0 if and only if dBne ("e;t)
d"e;t
< 0: Solving
for net as a function of capital and substituting the result into the Euler equation for capital,
qkt =
1
Rt+1efpe;t+1
[Akk("e;t+1)q
k
t+1(1 e)+Aky("e;t+1)

(1  )ze;t+1
wt+1
Bn;e("e;t+1)
 (1 )
1 (1 )
k

1 (1 ) 1
e;t+1 ]:
dBne ("e;t)
d"e;t
< 0 implies that as before the right hand side of this equation is decreasing in
"e;t+1: Since k

1 (1 ) 1
e;t+1 is decreasing in ke;t+1; a higher "e;t+1 must lead to a lower ke;t+1:
Proof of 2,b): From the previous proof, we know that @ne;t
@"e;t
< 0 if and only if dBne ("e;t)
d"e;t
< 0;
where
1 + (1  sy)[H("e;t) + efpe;tG("e;t)]
(1  a+ aefpe;t) = Bne("e;t):
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:dBne("e;t)
d"e;t
=
efp0("e;t)
(1  a+ aefpe;t)2f(1  sy)[(1  a+ aefpe;t)G("e;t)  a(H("e;t) + efpe;tG("e;t))]  ag
=
efp0("e;t)
(1  a+ aefpe;t)2f(1  sy)[G("e;t)(1  a)  a(H("e;t)]  ag
=
efp0("e;t)
(1  a+ aefpe;t)2f(1  sy)[G("e;t) + ae;t
Z "e;t
0
"dF ]  ag
where the last equality uses H("e;t) + G("e;t) =  e;t
R "e;t
0
"dF: efp
0("e;t)
(1 a+aefpe;t)2 > 0; since
efp0("e;t) > 0: Therefore,
dBne ("e;t)
d"e;t
< 0 if and only if
(1  sy)[G("e;t) + ae;t
Z "e;t
0
"dF ]  a < 0
; that is
G("e;t) + ae;t
Z "e;t
0
"dF <
a
1  sy :
Since
G("e;t) + ae;t
Z "e;t
0
"dF < 1
; a  1  sy is a su¢ cient condition for
(1  sy)[G("e;t) + ae;t
Z "e;t
0
"dF ]  a < 0:
c) Rewrite the rst order condition for capital utilisation:
ue;t :
Aky("e;t)
Akk("e;t)
zek
a 1
e;t n
(1 )
e;t = eeu
 
e;t q
k
t :
We will show that Aky("e;t)
Akk("e;t)
is decreasing in "e;t: Since  > ; this implies that
@ue;t
@"e;t
< 0:
Ignoring time subscripts,
Aky("e)
Akk("e)
= 1 +
Aky("e)  Akk("e)
Akk("e)
= 1  sy(efpe("e)G("e) RP ("e))
1 + efpe("e)G("e) RP ("e) = 1 
sy
1 + 1
efpe("e)G("e) RP ("e)
:
efpe("e)G("e) RP ("e) is increasing in "e; so Aky("e)Akk("e) is decreasing in "e:
36
6 Appendix B, the balanced growth path:
I approximate the model around a balanced growth path (BGP) where ke;t; Ie;tye;t; hs;t;
hbo;t; cs;t; cbo;t; dt,let ; lbo;t and wt all grow at the same growth rate Gy   1: hours of work,
capacity utilisation rates, default thresholds and the real interest rate on deposits are all
constant in the BGP. This implies that the growth rates of total factor productivity in the
BGP are Gze = G
1 
y and Gzu = G
1 
y : Let ~xt =
xt
Gtx
; where Gx is the gross growth rate of
x in the BGP. x^t = xt xx where x is the BGP value of ~xt: I normalize zu = ze = 1: To nd
the BGP, rst detrend all rst order conditions and constraints.
1) We start by computing the default thresholds and idiosyncratic shock volatilities to
match BGP default rates.
For i = e; bo "i solves
1 = iGiefpi("i)R:
Note that this solution ignores the constraint that entrepreneur loans le  0 which may
in theory be violated due to the wages in advance constraint a¤ecting part of the wage bill. I
solve the model conjencturing that this constraint does not bind. Afterwards, I can compute
le and check that this is indeed the case. For my calibrations, this was never a problem with
Rle
Ge ~A
> 0 by a large margin.
There are two solutions to each of the above equations. The monotone hazard rate
assumption implies that the optimal solution is the lower "i solution. After picking the lower
solution interval, a simple bisection nds each "i:
We can then solve for various other expressions that are functions of "i such asHi; Gi; efpi;:
2) We need to compute the market clearing wage. This can be done by a bisection, in
which we solve for the model quantities conditional on a given wage, check if the labour
market equilibrium has converged and iterate if required. Since entrepreneurial nancing
frictions tend to lower the demand for labour relative to that of nancially unconstrained
rms, the wage in a model with nancially unconstrained rms is a reliable upper bound for
the solution of the model where all rms are nancially constrained.
2.1) Conditional on the guess for the wage rate we compute entrepreneur variables:
We already have "e from 1). We use the labour demand rst order condition to express
ne as a function of ke:
ne =
h
(1 )ze(ueke)
Anew
i 1
1 (1 )
, where Ane =
1 a+aefpe
1+(1 sy)(He+Geefpe) :
This allows us to use the euler equation for entrepreneur capital to solve for ke:
ke =
1
Gy
"
Gy
e
 (1 e)Akk
Ayk(Gzeze)
1
1 (1 ) ( (1 )ue
GywAne
)
(1 )
1 ((1 )
# 1 (1 )
 1
, where Ayk = 1 + (1   sy)(He +
efpeGe) and Akk = 1 + (1  sk)(He + efpeGe):
It can be shown that the expressions above are always positive.
Next, we can nd e from the rst order condition for ue :
e =
Au
e

Gy
e
 (1 e)Akk
Ayk

; where Au =
Ayk
Akk
:
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We normalise ue = 1; allowing us to identify e with the average depreciation rate in the
sample.
Given the variables above it is easy to nd ye; ~Ae; Ae, le = ( ~AeGe   awne)=R and ce =
Ae +He ~Ae   (1  a)wne + leGy   keGy:
2.2) Now we compute the borrower variables.
We already have the default threshold "bo and functions of this threshold from 1).
Using the rst order conditions for housing and labour supply we can solve for
hbo = Ahbocbo where Ahbo =
h
cGy(1 boG(1 h)[1+(1 sh)(Hbo+efpboGbo)]) ; and
nbo = 1  Anbo cbow where Anbo = nc[1+(1 sw)(Hbo+efpboGbo)] :
We can then also solve for Abo = (1  h)hbo+wnbo; ~Abo and lbo = Gbo ~Abo=R as functions
of cbo:
To compute cbo we plug the expressions above into the budget constraint and solve for
cbo :
cbo =
Xnbo
1+AhboXhbo+AnboXnbo
w where Xnbo = 1+(1  sw)( ~Hbo+ GyR Gbo) and Xhbo = Gy  (1 
h)[1 + (1  sh)(Hbo +Gbo GyR )]
Again, it can be shown that the expressions for cbo and hbo are always positive. nbo > 0
for any calibration in which ns > 0 since nbo > ns:
Given cbo; we can now go back and solve for the other borrower variables using the
expressions derived earlier.
2.3) Next we compute the variables for the savers.
For the savers, the solution is similar to that for the borrowers. We use the rst order
conditions for housing and labour supply to express hs = Ahscs; where Ahs =
h
cGy [1 G(1 h)]
and ns = 1   nc
cs
w
: We also determine deposits from the market clearing condition d =
ele+bolbo
s
:
We can then substitute the expressions above, using the results from all the previous
steps, into the saversbudget constraint to solve for cs =
(R Gy)d+w
1+(Gy (1 h))Ahs+ nc
:
3) We now check if the excess demand jne   sns   bonboj < "n; and update the wage
guess if necessary.
This concludes the solution of the BGP.
Alternatively, we can solve for the equilibrium wage analytically if we know the targeted
proportion of hours worked in the BGP. Suppose we have a target in mind for ne: The rst
order condition for capital can be solved for the equilibrium ye
ke
ratio as a function of "e:
ye
ke
= ze

ke
ne
 1
n 1e allows us to solve for
ke
ne
: The labour demand function can be written
as (1  ) ye
ne
= (1  )

ke
ne

n 1e = Ane("e)w: Since we know
ke
ne
; ne and "e we can solve
for w analytically. To make the labour market clear we adjust the labour supply through the
ratio n
c
for a given h until jsns + bonbo   nej < "N for a small "N : A good upper bound
for the labour market clearing n
c
can be found by solving the economy where only borrowers
work, while savers just earn income from deposits (this bound can be computed analytically
38
for Gy = 1; and it is usually also an upper bound for Gy > 1 but close to 1).
7 Appendix C, the model with a predetermined loan
rate with respect to aggregate shocks
For concreteness, I focus on the borrowing household. Similar derivations apply to the
entrepreneur.
Suppose that now Rlt must be determined before knowing the aggregate state of the
economy at t: Since lbo;t 1 is predetermined at t; This makes the repayment without default
Rltlbo;t 1 = "bo;t ~Abo;t predetermined.
As before, the bank can still diversify its exposure to the borrowersidiosyncratic shocks.
We can still write the banks expected repayments as
G("bo;t) ~Abo;t = Rbo;tlbo;t 1
for some Rbo;t  0; where
G("
bo;t) = [1  F ("bo;t)]"bo;t + (1  bo;t)
Z "bo;t
0
"bodF:
"bo;t must satisfy two conditions:
"bo;t =
Rltlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
and
G("bo;t) =
Rbo;tlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
:
Before we assumed that Rbo;t = Rt and allowed Rltlbo;t 1 to adjust as a function of aggregate
conditions to make the rst condition trivially hold. But now Rltlbo;t 1 is independent of the
aggregate state. As a result, if Rbo;t is independent of the aggregate state we have a system
of 2 equations in one unknown "bo;t that (generically) has no solution. Therefore, Rbo;t must
adjust as a function of the aggregate state. The contract can no longer be reduced to picking
a schedule of default thresholds "bo;t: Instead, the representative borrower now picks
cbo;t; hbo;t; lbo;t; dbo;t; R
l
bo;t+1; nbo;t; "bo;t
	1
t=0
to maximise
E0
1
t=0
botubo;t
subject to a sequence of budget constraints
cbo;t + qthbo;t + dbo;t =
qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + nbo;twt  RP ("bo;t)(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + lbo:t + dbo;t 1Rt
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,the participation constraints of the bank G("bo;t) (1  sh)qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 = Rbo;tlbo;t 1
and "bo;t =
Rlbo;tlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
:
The expected rates of return conditional on the aggregate state Rbo;t must now satisfy
s;t = Ets;t+1 Rbo;t+1:
This can be shown using either a decentralisation where savers are assumed to directly
make risky loans to borrowers, or an equivalent (by the Modigliani-Miller theorem) but more
realistic decentralisation where savers provide banks that they own with risk free deposits
and the banks lend out those funds at the risky rate Rbo;t+1; ,repay the borrowersdeposits
and distribute all prots(negative if they su¤er a loss) to the savers.
Note that the deterministic balanced growth path solution, around which we approximate
the dynamics, is the same as for the model where Rlt is conditional on the aggregate state.
For the entrepreneur, we get the same results if a = 0; otherwise we need to think
more carefully about the joint modeling of the intratemporal working capital loan and the
intertemporal loan. The most direct generalisation of the previous setup is to assume that the
predetermined loan rate Rle;t is the same on both types of loans. That is "e;t ~Ae;t = R
l
e;t(le;t 1+
awtne;t):With this assumption, the analysis for the entrepreneur nancial contract is similar
to that of the of the borrowers contract. Otherwise, we will need to model these two types
of loans separately.
8 Data Appendix
I use US aggregate data from the rst quarter of 1955 to the 4th quarter of 2004. All time
series are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
:
1)Cobst : sum of personal consumption expenditures on services and nondurables (PCESV+
PCND) divided by the GDP implicit price deator and civilian non-institutional population
over the age of 16
2) Ih;obst : Private residential xed investment (PRFI) divided divided by the GDP
implicit price deator and civilian non-institutional population over the age of 16.
3) Iobst : Private non residential xed investment (PNFI) divided divided by the GDP
implicit price deator and civilian non-institutional population over the age of 16.
The models GDP is dened as the sum of the three variables above. To match the
observable GDP in estimation I use the models value-added (before nancial frictions costs)
and add the nancial frictions related to households, which correspond to NIPAs inclusion
of nancial services in its services expenditure measure (see NIPA handbook, chapter 5 [28]).
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Table 1
Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value,Target
 Patient householdsdiscount factor  = 0:997; R  1 = 0:01
e Entrepreneursdiscount factor e = 0:95; leverage= 0:587
bo Borrower discount factor bo = 0:949; leverage= 0:76
 relative risk aversion coe¢ cient 2
Gy   1 trend growth rate of GDP 0:51%
 capital share  = 0:384; I
y
= 0:153
e; e capital depreciation rate e = 1:4%; e = 3:21
h housing depreciation rate 0:4%
 returns to scale 0:95
c;n; h u(:) weights of consumption, leisure, housing housing/GDPt 1:3; N s = 0:32
bo proportion of borrowers 0:4
 monitoring cost, entrepreneurs 0:45; 1:27%=4 credit spread
bo idiosyncratic shock std. dev, borrowers bo = 0:0993; 1:4%=4 default rate
e idiosyncratic shock std. dev, entrepreneurs e = 0:2086; 3%=4 default rate
sy output proportion seizable by lender 0:5
a wages in advance proportion 0:5
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Table 2
Estimated parameters
Prior Posterior
Distr. Mean/LB St. Dev/UB mode mean St. Dev 5% 50% 95%
 Gamma 4 1 3.999 4.086 0.5182 3.3 4.049 4.989
h Gamma 1 0.5 0.178 0.183 0.021 0.151 0.181 0.219
z Beta 0.75 0.15 0.934 0.933 0.0113 0.914 0.934 0.951
 Beta 0.75 0.15 0.968 0.966 0.0088 0.95 0.966 0.979
I Beta 0.75 0.15 0.858 0.859 0.0139 0.836 0.859 0.881
z Uniform 0 0.05 0.0051 0.0052 0.0003 0.0047 0.0051 0.0056
 Uniform 0 0.5 0.232 0.241 0.023 0.206 0.239 0.281
I Uniform 0 0.05 0.0252 0.0254 0.0014 0.023 0.0253 0.028
For uniform priors, the table provides the lower bound (LB) instead of the mean and the
upper bound (UB) instead of the standard deviation. The last columns provide percentiles
of the posterior distribution (90% probability intervals and median).
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Table 3,
Variance decomposition for level of variables
Var "z;t ";t "I;t
yt 0.71 [0.693, 0.708, 0.721] 0.042 [0.04, 0.042, 0.053] 0.248 [0.239, 0.25, 0.254]
ct 0.577 [0.574, 0.575, 0.58] 0.10 [0.097, 0.102, 0.108] 0.323 [0.311, 0.323, 0.327]
It 0.186 [0.181, 0.186, 0.191] 0.148 [0.114, 0.145, 0.191] 0.666 [0.628, 0.669, 0.695]
Iht 0.113 [0.101, 0.114, 0.126] 0.397 [0.356, 0.396, 0.438] 0.49 [0.436, 0.49, 0.542]
efpbo;t 0.089 [0.057, 0.088, 0.128] 0.611 [0.571, 0.616, 0.661] 0.3 [0.282, 0.296, 0.301]
efpe;t 0.136 [0.104, 0.134, 0.163] 0.662 [0.637, 0.665, 0.686] 0.202 [0.199, 0.201, 0.21]
sbo;t 0.083 [0.053, 0.083, 0.121] 0.638 [0.594, 0.642, 0.689] 0.279 [0.258, 0.275, 0.285]
se;t 0.162 [0.128, 0.161, 0.193] 0.632 [0.597, 0.635, 0.672] 0.206 [0.2, 0.204, 0.21]
Gbo;t 0.008 [0.004, 0.008, 0.015] 0.966 [0.952, 0.966, 0.978] 0.026 [0.018, 0.026, 0.034,]
Ge;t 0.073 [0.041, 0.075, 0.119] 0.863 [0.781, 0.86, 0.92] 0.064 [0.038, 0.065, 0.1]
Variance decomposition in growth rates (rst di¤erence of log-levels)
Var "z;t ";t "I;t
yt 0.739 [0.687, 0.738, 0.779] 0.109 [0.084, 0.111, 0.146] 0.152 [0.137, 0.151, 0.167]
ct 0.694 [0.646, 0.693, 0.731] 0.234 [0.195, 0.236, 0.285] 0.072 [0.069, 0.071, 0.074]
It 0.093 [0.081, 0.094, 0.107] 0.133 [0.118, 0.132, 0.148] 0.774 [0.771, 0.774, 0.776]
Iht 0.113 [0.089, 0.115, 0.145] 0.532 [0.478, 0.533, 0.581] 0.355 [0.33, 0.352, 0.377]
efpbo;t 0.08 [0.055, 0.08, 0.111] 0.626 [0.597, 0.632, 0.661] 0.294 [0.284, 0.289, .291]
efpe;t 0.20 [0.157, 0.197, 0.232] 0.552 [0.537, 0.556, 0.573] 0.248 [0.231, 0.247, 0.27]
sbo;t 0.086 [0.059, 0.085, 0.119] 0.605 [0.572, 0.61, 0.644] 0.309 [0.298, 0.304, 0.308]
se;t 0.229 [0.186, 0.227, 0.263] 0.522 [0.499, 0.526, 0.554] 0.249 [0.238, 0.247, 0.26]
Gbo;t 0.116 [0.08, 0.116, 0.157] 0.487 [0.457, 0.493, 0.531] 0.397 [0.385, 0.39, 0.391]
Ge;t 0.293 [0.247, 0.293, 0.336] 0.516 [0.464, 0.519, 0.575] 0.191 [0.178, 0.188, 0.2]
Variance decomposition for HP detrended variables (smoothnes parameter  = 1600)
Var "z;t ";t "I;t
yt 0.734 0.721,0.764, 0.799] 0.109 [0.083, 0.102, 0.129] 0.157 [0.118, 0.133, 0.149]
ct 0.561 0.521, 0.557, 0.585] 0.296 [0.223, 0.265, 0.313] 0.143 [0.166, 0.178, 0.192]
It 0.097 0.121, 0.137, 0.152] 0.157 [0.174, 0.205, 0.238] 0.746 [0.64, 0.657, 0.673]
Iht 0.072 0.082, 0.097, 0.111] 0.453 [0.465, 0.528, 0.583] 0.475 [0.335, 0.375, 0.424]
Gbo;t 0.049 0.034, 0.048, 0.063] 0.782 [0.775, 0.782, 0.789] 0.169 [0.162, 0.171, 0.177]
Ge;t 0.241 0.202,0.24, 0.276] 0.594 [0.497, 0.548, 0.597] 0.165 [0.201, 0.212, 0.227]
For each shock the rst column provides the contribution to the variance of each variable
at the posterior mode. The second column provides 5%,50% and 95% percentiles of the
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posterior distribution of the contribution to the variance, approximated using 1000 draws
from the posterior distribution of p: I take logs for output, consumption, residential and non
residential investment and the leverage ratios Gbo;t; Ge;t: x% percentile variance contributions
need not add up to 1.
Table 4
Model simulation based statistics versus the data in (log) levels
var x corr(Y,X)
data 5% 50% 95% data 5% 50% 95%
y 3.1% 1.79% 2.56% 3.84% 1 1 1 1
c 3% 1.56% 2.16% 3.19% 0.798 0.658 0.822 0.914
I 10.4% 8.08% 11.28% 15.75% 0.473 0.255 0.534 0.73
Ih 14.6% 14.76% 20.15% 27.39% 0.592 -0.129 0.237 0.543
var corr(I,X)
data 5% 50% 95%
y 0.473 0.255 0.534 0.723
c -0.071 -0.276 0.052 0.372
I 1 1 1 1
Ih 0.069 -0.744 -0.51 -0.163
Data is linearly detrended variables in logs. Model simulations are detrended by common
BGP trend and in logs. I simulate 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of the estimated
parameters. For each posterior draw, I simulate 400 samples of length 300, dropping the
rst 100 observations as burn-in. After the US sample statistics, I report medians and 90%
condence intervals of model simulations. The rst columns examine standard deviations,
the next columns examine contemporaneous correlations with output and investment.
Table 5
Model simulation based statistics versus the data for growth rates
var x corr(y,x)
data 5% 50% 95% data 5% 50% 95%
y 0.76% 0.81% 0.93% 1.07% 1 1 1 1
c 0.51% 0.84% 0.98% 1.16% 0.783 0.91 0.931 0.947
I 2.36% 2.31% 2.66% 3.08% 0.719 0.445 0.533 0.61
Ih 4.57% 4.41% 5.08% 5.89% 0.63 -0.227 -0.085 0.058
var corr(I,x)
data 5% 50% 95%
y 0.719 0.445 0.533 0.61
c 0.313 0.172 0.281 0.385
I 1 1 1 1
Ih 0.1848 -0.654 -0.559 -0.449
Growth rates are computed as the rst di¤erence of the log-levels. I simulate 1000 draws
from the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters. For each posterior draw, I
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simulate 400 samples of length 300, dropping the rst 100 observations as burn-in. After the
US sample statistics, I report medians and 90% condence intervals of model simulations.
The rst columns examine standard deviations, the next columns examine contemporaneous
correlations with output and investment.
Table 6
Model simulation based statistics versus the data, HP lter (smoothness parameter  =
1600)
var x corr(Y,X)
data 5% 50% 95% data 5% 50% 95%
y 1.57% 0.98% 1.18% 1.42% 1 1 1 1
c 0.83% 0.97% 1.19% 1.46% 0.878 0.773 0.856 0.91
I 4.64% 4.07% 5.19% 6.58% 0.795 0.292 0.504 0.669
Ih 9.81% 8.025% 10.24% 12.99% 0.705 -0.346 -0.096 0.166
var corr(I,X)
data 5% 50% 95%
y 0.795 0.292 0.504 0.669
c 0.617 -0.12 0.123 0.354
I 1 1 1 1
Ih 0.227 -0.808 -0.677 -0.479
I take logs and HP lter (with smoothness parameter  = 1600) both the data and the
model simulations. I simulate 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of the estimated
parameters. For each posterior draw, I simulate 400 samples of length 300, dropping the
rst 100 observations as burn-in. After the US sample statistics, I report medians and 90%
condence intervals of model simulations. The rst columns examine standard deviations,
the next columns examine contemporaneous correlations with output and investment.
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Figure 1: 1 standard deviation TFP shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 2: 1 standard deviation TFP shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 3: 1 standard deviation TFP shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 4: 1 standard deviation TFP shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 5: 1 standard deviation investment shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 6: 1 standard deviation investment shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 7: 1 standard deviation credit shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 8: 1 standard deviation credit shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 9: 1 standard deviation credit shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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Figure 10: 1 standard deviation credit shock. Blue circles: model with all credit frictions
on. Green stars: model with only rm credit frictions. Red diamonds: model with only
household credit frictions. Green crosses: no credit frictions
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